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David Fraser* The First Cut Is (Not) The
Deepest: Deconstructing "Female
Genital Mutilation" and the
Criminalization of the Other
Deconstruction, as a 'philosophy'andas a strategy for the reading of texts, offers
us the ability to engage in a politics and ethics of justice which seeks to recognize
our responsibility to the Other. By 'reading' 'female genital mutilation' with this
obligation in mind, this article attempts to deal with the prejudices and barriers to
justice which present themselves to those of us in the West who seek an
engagement with the Other. The article offers a warning and a reading of the 'text'
of 'female genital mutilation' informed by our obligation to justice.
Can you bear to know what I have lost? I scream this at the judges
in their stupid white wigs.
Alice Walker




Introduction: Deconstruction and Mutilation
Before the article begins, before we "cut" to the beginning, there are
epigrams, the beginning of writing, writing a beginning. One, the first,
speaks of a pain, unspeakable, unknowable to/by/in law, a pain which is
illegal. The second speaks also of the unspeakable, the secret, the society
to which we do not and cannot belong, an out-law society. They speak and
write about "female genital mutilation". They incorporate a corporeal
practice, written on and about, around the body of the Other. Like this
article, they inscribe themselves in and on the body of the Other, an act
of speaking, of writing, of Law, of violence. Thus an article which
incorporates the body of the Other in the body of the Law-a cannibalistic
act of legalized violence.
Thus, an article about law and perhaps about justice, just an article, but
a just article? Can one be just? Can one be just about justice? Hence, the
* Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. The Law Foundation of New South Wales provided
partial funding for research support for this article. Thanks are due to M. Melhem for research
assistance. Thanks also to V. Black, R. Devlin, J. Gava, S. Veitch and J. Stubbs for helpful
comments. Thanks especially to Kate for support and encouragement. Copyright D.F. 1995.
The First Cut Is (Not) The Deepest
epigrams. Appropriations of other texts, texts themselves about appro-
priation and justice. How appropriate? They precede the text. Written
above, beyond and before the text but nonetheless written as text. They
are a pre-text. They frame and limit the text, incorporating and limiting
the text which follows. This limited incorporation,' by way of pretext,
attempts to deal with the fundamental issues of justice which will come.
They speak of the unspeakable, of pain and of secrecy and of law. They
do not speak ofjustice, forjustice must, for the moment, remain unspoken
and forgotten.'
Thus, the absence of justice and of that which is missing from this
article. A deferral which cannot be deferred but which must be deferred.
A writing, a logistic deployment of the logos which limits that which
cannot be limited, in Drucilla Cornell's phrase, "a philosophy of the
limit",' a text which cannot name that which it seeks to name, which
writes the unwritable unspeakable and which limits justice. A written
intercession. A text as intercision, a cutting, an act of violence about and
around another act of violence. A consumption of the body of the Other
and of the body of the Law. Again a writing about a secret, unspeakable
which must be written, spoken and deferred, an aporetic opening, unsafe,
unsure, unsound, but not without sound, just or almost about justice. Not
a simple juxtaposition, not merely a limited deployment of the silence and
spoken of law and justice, of the opposition justice/injustice, but rather a
division which limits and incorporates that which can neither be limited
nor incorporated. An incorporation of the corporeal violence which
passes just in silence. A failed limiting of the sound of the corporeal
violence which is the secret society of injustice, an outlawed pre-text, cut
off from justice, but all about and around justice. This, then, is the point
of justice, the call to responsibility, to listen and to hear, a call of the mute
to the deaf.4
1. J. Derrida, Limited Inc (Evaston, I.: Northwestern University Press, 1988).
2. J.F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews" (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1990) at 3. "The Forgotten is not to be remembered for what it has been and what it is, because
it has not been anything and is nothing, but must be remembered as something that never ceases
to be forgotten. And this something is not a concept or a representation, but a 'fact'.. .namely,
that one is obliged before the Law, in debt."
3. C. Drucilla, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992).
4. The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions. It is the
experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the
rule, is still obliged-it is of obligation that we must speak---to give itself up to the impossible
decision, while taking account of law and rules. A decision that didn't go through the ordeal
of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application
or unfolding of a calculable process. But in the moment of suspense of the undecidable, it is
not just either, for only a decision is just. And once the ordeal of the undecidable is past (if that
is possible), the decision has again followed a rule or given itself a rule, invented or reinvented
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The key point of justice, in other words, is the question of responsibil-
ity, of our obligation to do justice and to be just in the simple face to face
with the Other. 5 We are responsible for and to the Other as a deontological
imperative, this is what it means to be just. But in this moment of
responsibility we must run the risk of all judgment, that we can, or in the
stronger case, must be wrong. In addition, as we accept our burden of
responsibility to the Other, we efface her by assimilating her to our
obligation. In other words, our responsibility to the Other, our duty to be
just, compels us to accept the burden of injustice. We must decide, that
is our responsibility. We must risk inevitable injustice, that is the nature
of our obligation. With this responsibility comes the burden of self-
examination. We must situate, as much as we can, our own textual and
other political interventions in order that they can at least bear the
appearance of justice, not a blind justice but a responsibility to and with
the Other.
Thus, this article is being written in a context which, in the interests of
justice, must be examined, explicated, interrogated, justified. It is being
written in an institution which likes to describe itself as prestigious. A
University in a settler dominion, fixed in its own heritage of conquest,
domination, subordination, colonialism, independence, neo/post-colo-
nialism. An institution whose primary function has always been to pursue
and propagate a hegemonic world-view under the guise of "liberal"
education. The institutional context then is one which oppresses and
silences under the mantle of openness, which colonizes under the rubric
of academic freedom and which instills in its members an idea/l of justice
while perpetuating a whole series of oppressions and colonizations.
This is being written, then, in a place in which the subject/object of this
essay has always been written. In the metropole, we write the "Third
World".6 A critical analysis, written in an institutional context such as
it, reaffirmed it, it is no longerpresentlyjust, fully just. J. Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical
Foundation of Authority' (1990) 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 919 at 963. For a recent and critical
opinion on deconstruction and justice see J. Balkin, "Transcendental Deconstruction, Tran-
scendental Justice" (1994) 92 Michigan L. Rev. 1131.
5. In responsibility, which is, as such irrecusable and non-transferable, I am instituted as non-
interchangeable: I am chosen as unique and incomparable. My freedom and my rights, before
manifesting themselves in my opposition to the freedom and rights of the other person, will
manifest themselves precisely in the form of responsibility, in human fraternity. An inexhaust-
ible responsibility: for with the other our accounts are never settled. E. Levinas, "The Rights
of Man and the Rights of the Other" in Outside the Subject (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1993) at 125. See also, J.L. Nancy, The Experience of Freedom (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993).
6. The phrase "Third World" is itself an inscription which is inscribed within the discourse of
its creation. In other words, "The Third World" is a creation of the metropolitan, imperialist
and colonizing discourses which are here under critical scrutiny. This hegemonic discourse
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this, must adopt a self-reflective stance. We must never lose sight of our
position at the center of the creation of hegemonic inscriptions. The
Other, of whom much will be written below, is forever absent from this
institution and this discourse. This is written around the Other, in a place
which is not her place, but not written in her place. The subje of the text
is unwritten, unwritable, silent in this context. I can but note her absence.
I can not, must notpresent her. That is my responsibility. Indeed, it is only
by adopting such a deconstructively wary approach that we can, in fact,
begin to respond to our responsibilities. Only by realizing our situation
can we begin the task of constructing responsible discourses, of existing
outside the incisions of the Law, but inside the "Third World", at the
cutting edge of the discursive matrix which surrounds "female genital
mutilation".
Yet the law/Law remains our fundamental obligation towards the
Other. It is the Law of responsibility, the never exhausted obligation
vested in alterity which calls us to listen to the voice of the Other in
"female genital mutilation" as we look to transgress the boundaries and
limits of the other law/injustice by locating the trace, the point of incision
towards the Other. This is why our obligation and our responsibility to the
Other is inexhaustible, because the gift of alterity is the gift of the Law,
always circulating outside but in relation to, the possibility of extinguish-
ing the debt in/through Law.
We cannot be sure there is a way of destructuring Law. You see,
deconstruction cannot be transgression of the Law. Deconstruction is the
Law. It's an affirmation, and affirmation is on the side of the Law....
That's why writing in a deconstructing mode is another way of writing
Law. And this is paradoxical?
It is in this paradox of the apparent impossibility of escaping Law, yet
being obliged to attempt to fulfill our responsibility to the Other, that
those of us in the metropole must confront the locus of our face-to-face
with the Other. This locus, where we write, inscribe and confront the
Other, is not, in the "Third World", distant, strange and Other. Rather, we
encounter the Other and our impossible obligation to her here, in the
centers of knowledge production we call home. The issue of our respon-
sibility is a question, finally and firstly, but never in the last instance, of
the obligation of hospitality.'
must however be confronted on its own terms if it is to be deconstructed. See V. Nesiah,
"Toward A Feminist Internationality: A Critique of US Feminist Legal Scholarship" (1993) 16
Harvard Women's Law Journal 190 at 190-91.
7. J. Derrida, "Women in The Beehive: A Seminar with Jacques Derrida" (1984) subjects/
objects at 13.
8. See discussion below at note 178 and accompanying text.
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It is this responsibility which is our historical duty to the Other.
The Western metropole must confront its postcolonial history, told by its
influx of postwar migrants and refugees, as an indigenous or native
narrative internal to its national identity...9
To situate ourselves thus will require a willingness and a desire to
understand the contexts in which we construct and extend the circum-
stances and conditions which create, reproduce and expand the discursive
practices which serve as the grundnorms for "our" debates and interven-
tions in and around the topic of "female genital mutilation". In addition
to the primary and more obvious tropes of gender and sexuality, we must
interrogate our understandings of culture, law, medicine, and more
centrally those tropes which are most often either missing or marginalized
in Western, metropolitan discussions of "female genital mutilation",
imperialist, neo/post-colonial constructions of "the Other", in this case,
"the Third World Other."
We must somehow attempt to remember and respond to, even, or
especially, in those moments when responsibility appears to us as the
impossible call of the Other, the essential fact that it is in effect and in
reality "our" world which creates a "Third World" in which US Marines
occupy Somalia with a policy of "shoot to feed", where General
Mohammed Farah Aidid moves from being a "father" of his country, to
a "war-lord" whose "gangs" of "thugs" "murder" UN soldiers. In Aidid's
transformation from a partner in negotiations to a man with a price on his
head, hunted down by elite forces of the United States and then back once
again into a partner in negotiations as the United States attempts to
"extricate" itself from an imbroglio described by the State Department as
a successful humanitarian mission,10 we find a recent example of our
complicity and participation in the construction of competing, mutually
contradictory colonialist discourses which share, beneath their contradic-
tions, a core-the "Third World"-as a place to be comprehended and
conquered as the Other to the global discourse of Western intervention
and imperialism. Indeed, the Somali "crisis" can itself be recast as an
example of the complicitous silence of Western legal and political
discursive interventions in the debate around our "responsibility" in
relation to the horrors of "female genital mutilation".
The most recent and authoritative sources estimate that "female
genital mutilation" is a virtually universal practice in Somalia where
almost four million women have been subjected thereto.1 ' Moreover, it is
9. H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994) at 6.
10. See A. Shoumatoff, "The 'War-lord' Speaks" (4 April 1994) The Nation 442.
11. See N. Toubia,Fernale GenitalMutilation:A Callfor GlobalAction (New York: Women
Ink, 1993).
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the influx of women from countries like Somalia into Western Europe,
North America and Australia which has brought the practice to the
attention of "the West" in a way never before experienced, with the
accompanying media coverage and public awareness.
What is missing from the picture of "our" increased awareness, shock
and horror, however, is any critical intervention into the surrounding
debate of the ways in which the "problem" has always been, in fact, "our
problem". By this I mean that while it is the influx of immigrants and
refugees into the West which has given rise to current debates and
interventions, these very debates and interventions continue to take place
all the while ignoring the complex facts and contexts which have given
rise to the influx itself. It is as if these women just suddenly appeared on
"our" doorsteps, instantly bringing to the fore the best of our charitable
instincts to act on their behalf.
In fact, of course, the "refugee problem" is a Western problem, not
because "they" are now here but because the problems of "refugees",
"civil unrest", "civil war", "tribal conflict", etc. are the direct conse-
quences not just of the colonial past but of the neo/post-colonial present,
the great power struggles of the Cold War, the greed and exploitation of
natural and human resources in the "Third World" by Western capitalists
and their indigenous mimics, the sale and traffic in arms and military
training of client states or regimes and last, but not least, the seldom
discussed market politics in refugees themselves-area quotas, chari-
table intervention and withdrawal, the interdependency of charities, host
and home nations' governments, the United Nations etc. When women
from Somalia (or anywhere else for that matter) arrive in the West,
victims of "female genital mutilation" who may or may not wish to
subject their daughters, nieces and granddaughters to the same practices,
our responsibility to them can not arrive out of our Victorian charitable
instincts towards the deserving poor, no matter how well-intentioned, but
out of our duty to respond to the cries which we have ourselves created
and then silenced. Why, then, does the fate of John Wayne Bobbitt' s penis
attract "our" attention while neo/post-colonial outrages reach us only
when, as in Burundi and Rwanda, the scale of human suffering reaches
a critical, televisual mass? And only then to repeat and reinforce the
colonial and imperialist fallacy of historical, deep-seated racial or tribal
animosities, without reference to the realities of imperial colonialism, the
passing of which is viewed with increasing nostalgia?12 Back then, of
12. An underlying message in the dominant textual and televisual images which inform 'our'
understanding of current developments in places like Rwanda or Burundi is the idea of the
'good old days' of colonialism. The heyday of imperialist intervention is invoked daily as a
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course, the natives knew their place. Now, Hutu and Tutsi massacre the
Other, indistinguishable except in the con-text, the discursive lie, of neo/
post-coloniality, of arms deals, of the geo-political written in the decom-
posing flesh of the "Third World" killing fields and graveyards.
The question then becomes at once more complex and simpler. We
must contextualize our response so that it is responsive and responsible.
We must, at the most basic and fundamental level, begin to escape the trap
of the position in which we find ourselves, either as Western "white"
feminists or as men, to escape the binds and double binds of chromatism
and genitalism. We must begin to run the risk of error by acting in a
"responsible" manner by listening and responding to the cries of silence
which must by definition surround the question of "female genital
mutilation". We must seek to escape the discourse which seeks to
surround the issue in the West with an amnesia about the colonial past, a
silence about the neo-imperial present and an aggressive attempt to create
and recreate an Other whom we must save.
It is not a solution, the idea of the disenfranchised speaking for themselves,
or the radical critics speaking for them; this question of representation,
self-representation, representing others, is a problem. On the other hand,
we cannot put it under the carpet with the demand for authentic voices; we
have to remind ourselves that, as we do this, we might be compounding the
problem even as we are trying to solve it. And there has to be a persistent
critique of what one is up to, so that it doesn't get all bogged down in this
homogenization; constructing the Other simply as an object of knowledge,
leaving out the real Others because of the ones who are getting access into
the public places due to these waves of benevolence and so on. I think that
as long as one remains aware that it is a very problematic field, there is
some hope.1
3
It is thus in the problematics of a deconstructive ethical practice where
we must encounter the possibilities of a political discourse in the West
around and about the practice of "female genital mutilation". It is in the
wary recognition of the mutable problematics of the debate that our
responsibility comes. There are several spaces, lacunae, traces, gaps in
our search for justice. This is the aporia which arises out of the obligation
time/place where 'native' brutality and 'barbarism' were subdued and attenuated by the
mediating influence of 'culture'. The 'African' is constructed for us as someone who has
slipped back into 'tribalism' after gaining 'independence'. See CNN everyday.
13. G.C. Spivak, "Questions of Multi-culturalism" in The Post-Colonial Critic (New 'York:
Routledge, 1990) at 63. On the issue of representation and the corruption of Law, see J.
Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) at 297. "As
corruptive principle, the representive is not the represented but only the representer of the
represented; it is not the same as itself. As representer, it is not simply as the other of the
represented; the evil of the representer or of the supplement of presence is neither the same
nor the other. It intervenes at the moment of difference, when the sovereign will delegates
itself, and when, in consequence, law is written."
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and responsibility we have to the Other in the face to face. We must seek
to do justice and to be just. But justice can never be done, finished. It is
an unfinished and unfinishable project but a project to which we are
called, compelled by and in the face to face. The aporia here delimits the
impossibility of doing justice and compels us to do justice. This impos-
sibility/obligation is the responsibility of the ethical. Thus, we are called
to the world/word of justice by a Law of obligation. This is the legal duty
to be just. It is a duty which we must assume, which we cannot assume
lightly and which imposes itself on us, wherever we find ourselves.
14
I. Female Genital Mutilation-Discursive Practices
and Responsibilities
1. Medicalizing the Body of the Other
Many others who have written about this issue in the various discourses
of the Western metropolis (medical, anthropological, legal and political)
have already offered detailed descriptions of the various practices and
procedures which fall under the more general rubric "female genital
mutilation", as well as detailed studies of the practices in various
countries and regions. I shall simply summarize them here in order to
provide an introductory access to those issues of more primary interest in
this essay, this attempt to hear the call of the aporia of justice.
In addition, I believe it is important in the current circumstances of the
debate itself and of my personal and institutional privilege to limit
"descriptions" of the practices in question in order to avoid, in so far as
it is possible, the twin strategies of cold, "scientific" description on the
one hand and horror on the other, so often deployed in metropolitan
interventions. Each seems to rely upon a voyeuristic reduction of the
Other to object which is symptomatic of the injustice in question here, an
injustice which, in the descriptive practices of Western intellectuals, is
never really "in question".
The practices grouped under the title of "female genital mutilation"
are generally of four types: I--"circumcision" or sunna which involves
the excision of the clitoral prepuce. 2-Excision which involves not only
the prepuce but usually the entire clitoris and sometimes part of the labia
minora. 3-Infibulation or Pharaonic "circumcision" which involves the
removal of the mons veneris as well as the entire labia and usually
involves the closure of the vaginal orifice. 4-Introcision involving the
14. See J. Derrida, Aporias (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
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cutting of the vagina or splitting of the perineum with the fingers or a
sharp instrument. 5
These acts are committed in a variety of countries, mostly in Africa, but
the practice is also known among a limited group in India,16 and is
reported in some anthropological studies from parts of Brazil and more
anecdotally in parts of Indonesia and Malaysia. 7 Female genital mutila-
tion is often associated, even among those who practice it, with Islam, but
it is neither part of accepted Muslim doctrine, belief or practice, nor is it
part of the culture of the largest Islamic nations like Saudi Arabia. In
general, then, it is safe to say that the practice of "female genital
mutilation" is centered on those parts of the African continent which have
significant numbers of believers in the Islamic faith but that it cannot
itself be attributed to religious doctrine.
While there is much debate about the origins of the practice, as there
is on the questions surrounding the explanations and justifications for its
continuation and prevalence, the most important focus for the purposes
of the current interventions in the West appears to be located around the
trope of "culture". It is to this signifier that we must turn if our deconstructive
project is to even begin to be responsive and responsible.
Western discursive interventions into the area of "female genital
mutilation" have focused in recent years on the apparent conflict between
metropolitan universalizations found in "feminist" or "human rights"
analyses of the relevant issues on the one hand, and arguments based in
critiques and applications of "cultural relativism" on the other. It is not my
15. See J. Verzin, "Sequelae of Female Circumcision" (October 1975) 5 Tropical Doctor
at 163; A. Mustafa, "Female Circumcision and Infibulation in the Sudan" (1966) 73 J. Obstet.
Gynaec. Brit. Cwlth. 302; L. Lowenstein, "Attitudes and Attitude Differences to Female
Genital Mutilation in the Sudan: Is There A Change on the Horizon?" (1978) 12 Soc.Sci. &
Med. 417. H. Rushwan, "Female Circumcision" (April-May 1990) World Health at 24; M.
Dirie, "A Hospital Study of the Complications of Female Circumcision" (October 1991) 21
Tropical Doctor 146; D. Gordon, "Female Circumcision and Genital Operations in Egypt and
the Sudan: A Dilemma for Medical Anthropology" (1991) 5 Medical Anthropology Quarterly 3;
L. Longo, "Sociocultural Practices Relating to Obstetrics and Gynaecology in a Community
of West Africa" (1964) 89 Am.J.Obst. & Gynec. 470. More detailed interventions can be found
in Toubia, supra note 11; F. Hosken, The Hosken Report: Genital and Sexual Mutilation of
Females (Lexington, Mass.: Women's International Network News, 1982); 0. Koso-Thomas,
Circumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication (London: Zed Books, 1987).
16. See R. Ghadially, "All for'Izzat"', (1992) 66 Manushi 17. It is important to note here that
only one group, the Daudi Bohras, practices "female genital mutilation". The practice is
unknown among other Indian Muslims. This should serve as a cautionary note against
simplification and the creation of Western taxonomies like "Islam" or "India" in dealing with
this or other questions. It is also worth noting that the practice apparently occurs among the Beth
Israel or Falashas of Ethiopia, most of whom have now made their way to Israel. See Toubia,
supra note 11, at 25.
17. See Toubia, supra note 11.
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intention here to address the historical and polemical developments on
either side of the issue. Suffice it to say that proponents on the former side
of the question argue that "female genital mutilation" is a phenomenon
which can be understood either as part of a more universal patriarchal
oppression of women in general, and of female sexual independtnce in
particular, or as an infringement of generally accepted international
principles of human rights. For those on this side of the debate, arguments
that the practices under question are deeply embedded in the cultures
where they are found are simply a way of further ignoring the harsh and
tragically real adverse effects of the practices on the women who are the
victims of these "abuses". For them, "torture is not culture".'8
On the other side of the debate, are those who adopt a position now
characterized as "cultural relativism". For them, claims to a universaliz-
ing frame of reference, be it "feminism", "patriarchy", or "human rights",
come almost invariably from the metropolitan center and are attempts to
import imperialist concepts and constructs under an apparently neutral
appeal to universal "human" values. Those who condemn "female genital
mutilation" are condemned for their "Eurocentric" frame and their
insensitivity to local, indigenous culture. They are, in other words,
perpetuating colonialism under a new guise. 19
2. Culture and Justice-The Death of the Other
What is striking about each of these apparently contradictory positions is
not the seemingly basic opposition which characterizes their relationship,
but the fundamental point of discursive commonality they share. Both
discourses, with some notable exceptions, 20 are firmly rooted in the
Western neo/post colonial tradition of the identity of the Other. Both the
18. See A. Walker and P. Parmar, Warrior Marks: Female Genital Mutilation and the Sexual
Blinding of Women (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993) at 95 for the most powerful and well-
known of these interventions. See also, A. Walker, Possessing the Secret of Joy (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1992) for a striking "fictional" account of the issues.
19. For the most recent interventions on these issues in the field of legal scholarship, see K.
Brennan, "The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law: Female
Circumcision as a Case Study" (1989) 7 Law and Inequality 367; I. Gunning, "Arrogant
Perception, World-Traveling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital
Surgeries" (1992) 23 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 189; R.C. Smith, "Female
Circumcision: Bringing Women's Perspectives into the International Debate" (1992) 65
Southern California L.Rev, 2449; A. Funder, "De Minimis Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris,
Culture, and the Law" (1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems; "Note,
What's Culture Got To Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision"
(1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1944. More generally, see N. Kim, "Toward A Feminist
Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical
Absolutism" (1993) 25 Columbia Human Rights L. Rev. 49.
20. See discussion below.
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universalizing claims of feminist or human rights discourse and the
claims to sensitivity to local conditions and traditions by the proponents
of the cultural relativism position ignore the realities of the imperialist
tradition which shapes the two discourses. The former seeks a global
epistemological stance grounded in a contingent historical system of
institutional practices and discourses which seek to efface the otherness
of the Other, while the latter position seeks to recognize and remember
the Other by granting her an absolute alterity. 2' Each in its own way shares
in the legacy of the Western metaphysic of a logocentric discourse which
is both willfully blind and deaf to the cries of the Other for an impossible
Justice.2 At the same time, on the level of the phenomenological or
existential, each discourse tends to treat the concept of "culture", in either
its universalist or localist manifestations, as a static social structure which
can be encapsulated, recapitulated and in fact, circumscribed in an
equally static and non-contingent discourse. Each discourse, in its own
way, freezes the Other in a frame of alterity/identity which creates a
boundary-culture-which can not be transgressed because it is at once
universal and unique.
Even a cursory examination of the literature which attempts to de-
scribe and capture the limits and excesses of the cultural practices in
question quickly reveals the deconstructive moment in which the prac-
tices escape the logos and logistics of the non-contingent, un-self-
awareness of the colonial discourses.
For example, in Lawrence Longo's article on the practices of the
Yoruba people,23 the author offers the opinion that "much may be found
to commend in some Yoruba practices"24 but goes on to add that the
practice of "female genital mutilation" is not one of them. According to
Longo:
The physician must explain the rationale for rejection of harmful practices
and assist the populace in appreciating more fully the advantages of
scientific medical care. For this reason, this bilateral education process is
the prerequisite to the success of any program of modem medicine. 5
21. See Derrida, "Force of Law", supra note 4; Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", supra
note 2.
22. See e.g. K. Engle, "Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the
Exotic Other Female" (1992) 26 New England L. Rev. 1509 for an intervention that offers
evidence of the effacement of alterity through the "recognition" of the Other. For some
criticisms of Western feminist interventions into the debate which are in part similar to my own
position, see V. Kirby, "On the Cutting Edge: Feminism and Clitoridectomy" (1987) 5
Australian Feminist Studies 35.
23. See supra note 15.
24. Ibid. at 474.
25. Ibid.
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According to Longo, this "bilateral education process" requires the
physician to acquire some knowledge of local practices to enable a better
evaluation of "those practices that are valuable and should be encour-
aged, those that are detrimental and should be discouraged, and those that
require further evaluation and how best this should be done within the
framework of local beliefs."26
Here we find a classic example not just of that which has given rise to
many of the critiques gathered under the heading of "cultural relativism"
but of the reduction of the Other to an object of knowledge and study. The
"bilateral" education process is designed to function in a unilateral
fashion, i.e. to allow the doctor to gain sufficient "knowledge" to
determine, according to the standards of "modem medicine", those local
customs which fall inside or outside the parameter of an imposed
"scientific" paradigm. In the worst, or most typical case, the local
population are to become willing participants in a process whereby they
are reduced to an object of study, to provide information which, always
for their own good, will be used to allow them to be "given" the benefits
of the modem world of Western medicine.
In the political economy of the neo/post-colonial intervention of
Western medical knowledge in the "Third World", knowledge flows in
a limited circuit of production/reproduction, the sole purpose of which
is to achieve the reality of an imperialist hegemony under the guise of
increased sensitivity to local practices and customs. In this political
economy, medical knowledge flows in these limited circuits as an
economic function of exchange and the calculated circulation of com-
modity value (the Other as object of study, the world market in pharma-
ceuticals, the profession of anthropology, capitalism in the "Third
World", etc.) in the legal/libidinal economy of signifying events. We in
the metropolitan center cancel our debt, we pay our obligations for
colonial abuses through neo/post-colonial paternalism, and we forget
about it. But we forget here about forgetting, about forgetting that we
cannot forget. We forget and forego justice by reducing and inflating the
Other to an object of knowledge. Our debt, our Law, is not one which can
be forgotten or foregone under the rubric of medical knowledge, progress
or human rights. Justice can not be forgotten and reduced to the
economics of commodity circulation in the "Third World". Rather
justice, our obligation, our gift to/from the Other does not belong to the
economy or to the present, but rather to the past and the future, to the
26. Ibid.
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deferred justice of the differend. 27 The "memory" of this debt, a debt
which flows from colonization is a memory of the future, of a displaced
alterity which calls us, but which we can neither fully heed or ignore.
"The possibility of the impossible commands here the whole rhetoric of
mourning, and describes the essence of memory." 8
To begin to escape to a possible deconstructivejustice which can begin
to account for our responsibility, in order to be responsible for our
accountability, we must first escape from not only the political economy
of interventions in the "Third World" but from its concomitant urge to
charity towards the deserving poor and move towards the disruptive
justice of the gift. This is the point at which we begin again to come face
to face with our obligation to justice and to the dilemma of responsibility.
To recognize the Other through the traditional Western ideals of charity
or humanity is to deny her alterity. She becomes "just like us". Our
relationship with her is thereby limited to the terms of capitalist commod-
ity circulation. Our obligation, justice, becomes a process of commensu-
rability. Responsibility becomes commerce. What is required to be just
is a new form of relationship which is not exhausted in commensurability
or rendered impossible by incommensurability. A gift which is not
rendered futile by its entry into mere commodity circulation.
If there is gift, the given of the gift, (that which one gives, that which is
given, the gift as given thing or as act of donation) must not come back to
the giving (let us not already say to the subject, to the donor). It must not
circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted,
as a gift by the process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the
circle in the form of return to the point of departure. If the figure of the
circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain aneconomic. Not that
it remains foreign to the circle, but it must keep a relation of foreignness
to the circle, a relation without relation of familiar foreignness. It is
perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible. Not impossible but the
impossible. The very figure of the impossible. It announces itself, gives
itself to be thought as the impossible.
29
To escape from the political economy of Longo's knowledge produc-
tion or from calls to "culturally sensitive" health care,3" no matter how
well-intentioned, in other words to begin an approach to the question
27. For an explanation of this term, see J.F. Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
28. J. Derrida, Memoires for Paul De Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989)
at 34.
29. J. Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1992) at 7. Derrida expands on the ethics of the gift in "Donner ]a mort", L'Ethique du Don,
J-M. Rabatd and M. Wetzel eds. (Paris: Mdtaili6-Transition, 1992) at 11.
30. See B. Calder, "Female Circumcision/Genital Mutilation: Culturally Sensitive Care"
(1993) 14 Health Care for Women Int'l 227.
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which will in fact deconstruct the question itself in a quest for justice,
some attempt must be made to place the question of "female genital
mutilation" into contexts which are themselves at one and the same time
more accurate and more contingent. "We" must, then, now begin to
remember, to re-write, to re-inscribe the texts of "female genital mutila-
tion" into responsible and responsive discourses, to heed the impossible
call to the impossible, justice.
Many of the inquiries which would be necessary to even contemplate
beginning this process are beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless,
it must be remembered that the framework for a deconstruction of current
discursive interventions in the field is already present in those same
interventions. To fully examine the possibilities and contingencies in-
volved in any quest to hear the unspoken, one should first hear that which
is in fact spoken.
To take but one example then, of the text, "female genital mutilation".
In the Sudan, where the practice is often described as "universal", "female
genital mutilation" is not, in fact, universally practiced. In the southern
part of that country, for example, the practice is not followed by the
Nilotic groups except as a result of interaction and intermarriage with
"Arab" groups.31 To begin to enter into any discussion of the issue in this
one country would require a sophisticated knowledge of the ethnography
of the country, which in turn would require an awareness of the potential
"Orientalist" origins of such ethnographic knowledges as well as a
willingness to explore not only the "history" of the country with the same
provisos, but the very idea that the "country" itself as a concept embedded
in colonial aggression and the hegemonies of knowledge flowing there-
from.
Similarly, in relation to Somalia, which for a while at least, captured
our attention in the West, studies indicate that while "female genital
mutilation" is virtually universal, a variety of techniques are used, the
practice changes according to ethnicity, geographical region, class and
educational background etc. When these factors are combined with
problems of "civil war", starvation, the dislocations suffered as a result
of these and other phenomena, the idea of a complete "understanding" of
the issue of "female genital mutilation" in Somalia, either in terms of a
dominant patriarchy or in terms of cultural sensitivity, begins to smack of
absurdity and intellectual arrogance.32
Any attempt to understand the practice even in this limited area from
a position informed by the trope of patriarchy, for example, would require
31. Mustafa, "Female Circumcision and Infibulation in the Sudan", supra note 15.
32. See Toubia, supra note 11.
324 The Dalhousie Law Journal
an attention to the "fact" that in some cases at least, men do not support
the practice while many women do,33 as well as an analysis of the
regressions effecting this study. Primarily here one would have to
consider facts of the closer relationships existing with various forms of
Western knowledges and ideologies in the urban centers among the
educated, largely male elite as well as the important psycho-social factors
of gender identity which are "internal" to women. At the same time, it
would be equally important to consider the influence of a Westernized
"feminism" among the female elite and the multiple ways in which all of
these factors are interrelated and circulate in the textual interstices of the
nation and of civil societies.
Even a wish to more fully understand the political economy of the
practice in some parts of the world requires a sophistication which is
absent from the current debates of the issue in the metropolitan center. For
example, it seems clear that the obstetric and other complications which
often follow these practices are a major issue in the current struggle to
abolish "female genital mutilation". But in addition to the individual
traumata and tragedies which frequently follow these procedures,34
health care in many areas of the world in which these procedures occur
is often in a state of crisis. At the micro-level, hospital facilities are often
over-burdened by an excessive number of patients suffering from the
sequalae of "female genital mutilations". The "fuller picture" is even
more complex. Obstetric and gynecological care in the "Third World" is
a major international issue, of which "female genital mutilation" is but a
part. While a great deal of focus in international fora in recent years has
been centered on a campaign to eradicate "harmful traditional practices"
such as "female genital mutilation",36 there is also now a turn to a greater
and deeper contextualization of this and related issues. In recent times, for
example, international organizations have been forced to turn attention
away from policies of population control by contraception to take a
broader approach to issues of health care in general, including prenatal
care, education and women's equality.3 7 To begin to talk and write about
"female genital mutilation" in such contexts might allow us to begin the
difficult task of trying to hear and respond responsibly to the voices which
speak not as some Eurocentricized "authentic Third World Woman", but
33. Lowenstein, supra note 15.
34. See e.g. Verzin, supra note 15.
35. See e.g. M. Dirie, "A Hospital Study of the Complications of Female Circumcision"
(October 1991) 21 Tropical Doctor 146.
36. See e.g. Forty-Sixth World Health Assembly (12 May 1993) Geneva.
37. See S. Chira, "Women Campaign for New Plan To Curb the World's Population" New
York Times (13 April 1994) AJ.
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which speak because they are bound to speak within and by the binding
boundaries of their position in the "Third World", as subaltern voices of
the Other, compelled within the libidinal/legal/political economies of
neo/post-colonial capitalism.
Even these contextualized approaches, however, often remain mired
in a limited approach to many of the underlying concerns which effect
health care in the "Third World". Very little is made in these broader
debates, or in the more narrow ones surrounding "female genital mutila-
tion", of the fact that many of the sources of the problems can in fact be
found in the history of Western imperialism. This means not only are we
required by the call to justice to look at how deeply implicated in the
creation of the "Third World" and its problems we are in an historical
sense, but we must also begin, as we have so far failed to do, to examine
the continuing impact of our practices of neo/post-colonial involvement
in the political economy which informs the reality of existence for the
majority of the world's population today.
Therefore to examine the proposition that health care should be
addressed in an holistic fashion and that poverty should be seen as a major
underlying causative factor in many of the health issues in the "Third
World", if left at that level, does not offer an analysis of the impact and
central role of the so-called world economy in the creation and mainte-
nance of the base conditions for the perpetuation of that poverty and
misery in the "Third World". Such an analysis would have to investigate
not just the traditional critical analytical categories of the creation of a
lumpenproletariat and industrial reserve army but also issues as seem-
ingly diverse as cultural imperialism,38 the ecological destruction of
much of the "Third World" and the role of international institutions like
the IMF and the World Bank. These international organizations and their
discourses impose structural reforms designed not only to further reduce
the material base of wealth in many countries but to insure their complete
integration into an international economy which is itself based in/on the
perpetuation of fundamental imbalances in the distribution of wealth both
on a national and international level. Such an analysis, outlined in a crude
form here, would begin to make both universalizing appeals to the tropes
of "human rights" or "patriarchy" or appeals to cultural "sensitivity"
appear in their true light as themselves deeply and perhaps inextricably
38. See A. Mattelart, Mass Media, Ideology and the Revolutionary Movement (Brighton:
Harvester Press, 1980); A. Dorfman & A. Mattelart, How To Read Donald Duck: Imperialist
Ideology in the Disney Comic (New York: International General, 1975); N. Chomsky & E.
Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston: South End Press, 1979).
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implicated in the neo/post-colonial structures which they seemingly wish
to criticize.
Further, in a turn on both the universalizing discourse emanating from
the West and their relativizing metropolitan counterparts, a brief exami-
nation of an institution at once Western and universal, the Roman
Catholic Church,3 9 and some of its Protestant counterparts, would quickly
reveal the complexity and interconnection of many issues. For example,
we must interrogate the influence of missionaries in creating a climate in
which it was acceptable both to denounce "traditional practices" as
barbaric and to offer charitable assistance to the primitive natives .40 These
discourses now manifest and reassert themselves with disturbing, if
somewhat more subtle, regularity in today's debates about and around
"female genital mutilation". Additionally, Western attempts to "Chris-
tianize" the "Third World" must now be read and decrypted for the role
they continue to play in the manifestations of the state of the cultural
hybridity which is, in fact, the key element missing from metropolitan
discourses about "female genital mutilation" today.
However, there is in this field, as in many others where it might be
possible to interrogate more fully the interactions of such Western
colonial practices as Christianity with the "local culture" in discourses
surrounding "female genital mutilation", an unwillingness to enter into
such inquiries or to recognize their relevance. The idea of seeing and
reading "native Christianity" as a form of Western colonial hegemony
which appears to dominate current critiques of religious imperialism, is
a universalizing Western discourse, occasionally supplemented with a
similarly Westernized and universalist critique of "patriarchy". This
form of incomplete, and therefore inaccurate, critique results in a distinct
failure to see the ironic and potentially liberatory textual possibilities and
contingencies which might be unveiled by such an interdependent
reading of the "two cultures".
By way of a brief example, before exploring the phenomenon of the
Western effacement of alterity in "female genital mutilation" in its other
manifestations, it is useful to note the contradictions which can result
39. See E. Israelewicz, "Women's Education the Key to Controlling Population Explosion"
The Guardian Weekly (15 May 1994) 3.
40. See J. Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (New York: AMS, 1978, reprinted from London:
Secker and Warburg, 1938) at 130. "The custom of clitoridectomy of girls, which we are going
to describe here, has been strongly attacked by a number of influential European agencies-
missionary, sentimental pro-African, Government, educational and medical authorities."
In 1990, the Kenyan government formally banned the practice. See "Kenya: Female
Circumcision Banned, Task Force Formed" (Summer 1990) 16 Women's Int'l Network News
24. The current government of Kenya has often spoken out against the practice. See (Spring
1993) 19 Women's Int'l Network News 44.
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from interventions based on a unilateral Eurocentric metropolitan read-
ing of "female genital mutilation". In colonial Kenya, Church of Scotland
missionaries converted many to their faith. They then found themselves
in the position of having to justify, in terms which they themselves had
introduced into the discursive matrix, their opposition "as Christians" to
the practices associated with "female genital mutilation". It seems that
the Kikuyu word muiritu was used in the translation of the word "virgin"
as in the Virgin Mary. In Kikuyu, muiritu signifies a girl who has
undergone the ceremonial process of "female genital mutilation" and
who is therefore initiated but unmarried. As one author noted the situation
was at least ironic:
So the native Christian is confronted with a puzzle. He finds the mother of
Jesus extolled and blessed in the faith he has embraced; but she is described
in the Bible as a young woman who has been initiated and circumcised.
And now the missionaries tell him that female circumcision is wrong.
4'
Instead of analy zing the "ulture" at play here in temrs 4f an episema-
logically pure category such as "imperialism" or "Christianity", it is
incumbent upon a deconstructive practice to seek to find ways of reading
the practices in question here as complex sites of hybridity where the
contradictory elements of "virgin" and "female genital mutilation"
circulate in a "culture" where each term is actively engaged and lived,
both as differend, and also as simply a part of a complex social structure
where contradictions and disputed meanings are encountered. In this
way, an engagement with the idea of "culture" as struggle might begin to
be our possible responsibility.
3. On Culture and the Struggle for Justice
For both of the apparent opponents in the rhetorical, legal and political
struggles over the phenomena described as "female genital mutilation" in
the West, the point of contact and seeming disagreement, the fulcrum of
the debate, is the concept of culture. On the one hand, we find claims that
there is, in essence a human culture, transcending national or local
specificities to encompass important and vital points of commonality,
either to allow us to identify a common category of cultural "victim"-
woman-or to name a category of protection or belonging-humanity-
human rights. On the other hand, we find appeals to multiplicitious
cultures, to the rich diversity of human experience. Putting aside the
potential danger of grounding multiplicity (cultures) in a singularizing
logos (humanity, human experience), one can be struck by the point at
41. See J. Huxley, Africa View (London: Chatto and Windus, 1931) at 197.
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which the two positions stop traveling in parallel lines and begin to
intersect in a crucial way. For each discourse, grounded in the Western
metaphysic of the present and of the Other, culture takes on an apparent
insular aspect. If it is universal or local, it is nonetheless separate and
distinct. There is no recognition that culture may actually be anything but
a static epistemological category. For the metropolitan discourses which
intervene and clash in the struggle over "female genital mutilation", there
is no idea of, no recognition of, however fleeting, the situation of culture
as an amorphous arena for political, ideological, legal or more generally,
discursive struggle.
This results not only in the analytical and consequential failures to take
into account the internal and external contingencies and complexities on
the "practical" contexts of issues surrounding "female genital mutila-
tion", but it also results in a more important omission, the forgetting of
forgetting, the omission that is the failure to heed the cries and calls to/
for justice.
Because each side in the metropolitan debate falls victim to the fallacy
of "culture" central to its conception to the needs and requirements of
"justice", in each instance it fails in its self-appointed task. By appealing
to either a Western or universal "culture" on the one hand, or to the
specificity of local "cultures" on the other, these metropolitan discourses
deny the Other, either by framing her as Same, thereby denying her
alterity or by recognizing her as Other,4 2 once again denying her alterity.
In its own way, each Western discourse deploys the trope of "culture",
which it clearly believes to be the signifier which can lead to the objet a,
or justice. 3 In this schematic reading of metropolitan emplotments of
"culture", "culture" in relation to the Other contains a hidden element in
the signifying chain. That hidden signifier, or in Derridean terms, the
trace, is the Other to whom we are called by our responsibilities under the
Law, and whose presence is determined by the lack or absence of identity.
The deconstructive project which seeks the contingent path to the
recognition of the unrecognizable, the possible presentation of the
impossible, the gift of justice, must begin, then, with a reconceptualized
"location of culture".44
42. See e.g. Engle, supra note 22.
43. See J. Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian
Unconscious" in tcrits (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977) at 320; J. Lacan, "A Love Letter"
in Feminine Sexuality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985) at 149. For Lacan, the 'objeta' (autre-
other) stands in relation to the (Autre-Other) as part of the object of desire and jouissance which
are always experienced as a lack but which nonetheless have a transgressive function. For an
introduction to the potential place of Lacanian theory in law, see D. Caudill, "Pierre Schlag's
'The Problem of the Subject' and Law's Need for an Analyst" (1993) 15 Cardozo L.Rev. 707.
44. See Bhaba, supra note 9.
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This reconceptualization of culture, has, of course, already begun.
Unfortunately, the fact that this reconceptualization has been ignored in
most of the discursive practices surrounding "female genital mutilation"
is itself another symptom of the more general malaise of political and
ideological interventions in the metropolitan center around issues in the
"Third World" and of their fixity on/in the ideological discursive hege-
monies of the West. But the primary purpose of even the present
intervention in the search for the possibility of justice is not to engage
exclusively or even primarily in the politics of blame. Rather, its purpose
is to seek points of incision where a possible exploration of justice in this
context might tentatively be located.
Thus, the primary task of this reconceptualization on/in/around the
tropes of justice and culture must be to seek to reorient the inquiry, again
in a tentative and speculative fashion, but one nonetheless that wishes to
be informed by the possibility of a manifestation of the impossible,
towards a different deployment of "cutture" and with it an emphasis on
a reoriented understanding of the dynamics, not the stasis, of imperialism
and neo/post-colonialism.
In other words, what we must seek is not just Homi Bhaba's location
of culture, itself perhaps somewhat static and hegemonic, but the tripar-
tite interventionist strategy proposed by Edward Said. Thus:
First, by a new integrative or contrapuntal orientation in history that sees
Western and non-Western experiences as belonging together because
connected by imperialism. Second, by an imaginative, even Utopian
vision which reconceives emancipatory (as opposed to confining) theory
and performance. Third, by an investment neither in new authorities,
doctrines, and encoded orthodoxies, nor in established institutions and
causes, but in a particular sort of nomadic, migratory, and anti-narrative
energy.45
This nomadic, contingent deconstructive politics of justice requires not
just the wariness of which Gayatri Spivak warns, 4 6 but an awareness of the
centrality, not of culture per se, but of the mutable arena of struggle over/
through/in culture which is central to the historical experience of racism
within the context of imperialism. The centrality of culture and struggle
over culture under racist imperialist conditions refers not only to the
"unilateral" experience of those oppressed and victimized by colonialism
but also to the central role of culture in the experience of the racist
colonizer. Fanon explains part of the phenomenon of cutturat sites in the
colonial experience:
45. E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993) at 337.
46. See supra note 13.
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The setting up of the colonial system does not itself bring about the death
of the native culture. Historic observation reveals, on the contrary, that the
aim sought is rather a continued agony than a total disappearance of the
pre-existing culture. This culture, once living and open to the future,
becomes closed, fixed in the colonial status, caught in the yoke of
oppression. Both present and mummified, ittestifies against its members47.
Culture, in this employment, then changes from a dynamic "demo-
cratic" process to a stasis associated with the subjugated status of the
oppressed. The anti-colonial struggle becomes, in part, a struggle to at
least maintain cultural practices which can be at one and the same time
"traditional" and dynamic. The obvious danger is that the "national"
struggle for and over culture will itself internalize the frozen status
imposed by colonial conditions as "natural" and that as a consequence,
the idea of culture as dynamic will be replaced with a naive appeal to the
simple preservation of a now surpassed and in reality erased and effaced
national culture,4" which then exists as a practice of nostalgia and
revisionism, the politics of forgetting disguised as the politics of memory.
For the colonizer, the strategy is not to eliminate but to stagnate, to
exoticize "native" culture, to transform it from culture as experience to
culture as object of study, as a phenomenon of the Other, reducible to
anthropology and ethnography. At this level, colonizer and colonized
appear to experience "culture" in incommensurable ways. But the heri-
tage of colonialism is also the history of Diaspora, of the creation of new
locales and sites in which cultures of the colonized and colonizer interact
in ways which neither could have foreseen or understood. These new sites
are in fact places where new cultural discourses are created which are the
direct creation of the dialogic flow of cultural signifiers through and
beyond the rigid and no longer impermeable categories of colonized and
colonizer. The border is transgressed.
49
In this way, cultures grow and mutate. "English" literature, then,
becomes impossible, or at least different than it would otherwise have
been, through the colonial experience." Likewise, but in different ways,
colonial cultures change as a result of the colonial experience and finally
with the actual experiences of the diasporas, the metropolitan center is
itself transformed.
47. F. Fanon, "Racism and Culture" in Toward the African Revolution (New York: Grove,
1980) at 34.
48. See F. Fanon, "On National Culture" in The Wretched of the Earth (New York, Grove,
1968) at 206.
49. See discussion below, infra note 108 and accompanying text.
50. See Said, supra note 45.
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This is not meant to suggest that imperialist aggression and coloniza-
tion are "good", nor that the diasporas which inevitably flow from this
heritage are themselves purely of benefit to all concerned. Rather, it is
merely to suggest that a dynamic, deconstructive intervention into the
realm of culture will perhaps permit a better, but always contingent,
approximation of the impossible. Once we have "reached" this stage,
which can never truly be reached, then perhaps, our metropolitan inter-
ventions into the debate on "female genital mutilation" can take into
account not only these factors but also render some homage or recogni-
tion to the location of this one practice in a complex web of local and other
practices which themselves offer evidence of independence and
interaction.
1
II. Writing the Body of the Woman/Law:
"Femnale Genital Mutilation" and Justice
1. The Body of the Law
One of the most troubling yet fascinating aspects of the current legal and
political debate surrounding the issue of "female genital mutilation" in
the metropolitan center52 is the apparent un-awareness of the tragic irony
which might be found in calls for the criminalization of the phenomenon.
Calls for the banning of the practice and the imposition of criminal
sanctions on those who perform the procedures (and in some cases
lawyers would argue of the person on whom the procedure is per-
formed),53 are made with increasing frequency and urgency. The sad
irony is that these calls for the criminalization of acts in relation to
women's bodies occur in a world in which women's bodies are them-
selves subjected to criminalizing sanctions by the very forces of the
patriarchal state apparatus which is here being invoked to seemingly
protect them. Thus, recent newspaper reports tell of women in India
whose foreheads were tattooed with the word "pickpocket". The police
in the Punjab, where the incident took place, claimed that the women were
tattooed by a mob which captured them in the act of stealing, but the
Indian Court believed that the police had tattooed the women after they
51. See R. Devisch, Weaving the Threads of Life: The Khita Gyn-Eco-Logical Healing Cult
Among the Yaka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
52. See below discussion at Part IV.
53. For example, there is relatively clear authority that a woman seeking an illegal abortion
is an accessory to the offense. See R. v. Price, [1969] 1 Q.B. 541. There is equally strong
grounds for arguing that in cases of "female genital mutilation" consert may not be a defense,
in which case the "victim" could perhaps be charged as an accessory, all other factors (e.g. age)
being considered. See R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 W.L.R. 556.
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refused to aid in the search by security forces for "terrorists" in Amritsar. 4
Others carry reports of women gunned down as they awaited a bus in
Algiers because they were bareheaded." Yet another report indicates that
one quarter of the female inmates at the Mulawa women's prison in New
South Wales have committed some acts of self-mutilation.5 6 In each case,
women's bodies are mutilated, graphically inscribed, because of their
criminalization. In this way, the process of criminalization becomes a
way of writing the force of the law on the female body as if it were a text
to be inscribed with a meaning flowing naturally from the criminalization
itself. Now, metropolitan proponents of the criminalization of "female
genital mutilation" wish to inscribe other female bodies, those of the
practitioners, with the body of law in order to punish them for their part
in another form of the physical inscription of the female body. At a tragic
level, the response of the Western metropolis to the violence of the word
which is the violence of the law operates in an un-self-reflective way and
thereby ignores the fundamental and fundamentally legal and unjust
commonality they share. The lack and the desire to fulfill this lack which,
in Western phallogocentric cultures define the "woman", here is simply
reinscribed in a more subtle but equally pernicious fashion.
We then find the tragic and horrible act of violence against the young
women, written figuratively and literally on her body by the law of the
Father, written in her blood." We also find competing calls for the Law
of the Father to be deployed to write another form of sovereignty over the
bodies of the female.
It is in such calls for the invocation of the full power of the text of the
state/Law through criminalization that we again find the problematic of
the Other inscribed in metropolitan interventions on the subject of
"female genital mutilation". For at the base of many calls for the
criminalization of these practices are embedded fundamental assump-
tions of the recognizability of the Other and the non-commensurability of
experience that we find, yet again, the two-fold and twice-told denial of
alterity and justice.
For example, in Susan Bordo's often devastating critique of the forces
behind the social construction of the female body, there is a conscious
54. See (1 May 1994) The Guardian Weekly 3.
55. See Y. Ibrahim, "Bareheaded, Women Slain in Algiers" New York Times (31 March
1994) A2.
56. See P. Totaro, "Inmates Turn to Bloody Activity" Sydney Morning Herald (23 April
1994) 8.
57. Or in the absence of blood. In either event, the Law of the Father will predominate. For
a moving account of the way in which the absence of blood can still be written in Law, see N.
Sadawi, "She was the Weaker" in She HasNo Place in Paradise (London: Minerva, 1989) at 9.
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effacement of the non-Western female body."' The Other, the non-
Western body, is absent, as if the construction of the female body in
popular culture did not and does not contain in the dominant portrayals
of the acceptable female form any messages about race or the culture of
imperialism. Indeed, in Bordo's world the phenomenon of the embodi-
ment of colonial racism in the body of the colonized subject is not relevant
in her construction of "Western Culture". Not for her any analysis of the
myriad and complex ways in which the bodies of the colonized are, in the
lived daily realities of their lives, chromatically inscribed in every aspect
of their interactions with, in and around the imperial reality.59 Of course,
the construction of "blackness" is present in Bordo's work since she
would not deny the effect and existence of racist discourse in "the West".
For her, however, "Western culture" is in reality American culture. Her
recognition of "race" comes about here simply as a result of the Other in
America. But for the apparently immutable fact in Western/American
culture of the Diaspora of the Afican slaw es, the Othey -would not figure
in our constructions of Western culture. In the end, there is no critique of
the slave origins of "American" culture for Bordo, who remains con-
cerned only with a single and singular alterity, woman, which is itself
grounded in her own version of the politics of identity, exclusion and the
effacement of the Other in neo/post-colonialism.
In this, Bordo's analysis is typical of the effacement of the Other who
simply is never recognized. On the other hand, in those discourses which
attempt to recognize the absolute alterity of the Other, the same process of
effacement exists.6° In the cultural relativity discourse, there is a marked
tendency to equally ignore the sites at which the body of the Other, the
"African Woman" for example, is again inscribed with Western tropes and
signifying functions.61 Again and again the Other, the "African" "woman"
is effaced in the inescapably racist discourse of the West.
2. Contaminations of Metropolitan Justice
One of the principal ways in which metropolitan discourses on "female
genital mutilation" are implicated in the colonial construction of the body
of the female Other is to be found in their failure to offer a contextualized,
58. See Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (BerkeLey" Univer-
sity of California Press, 1993).
59. See F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967).
60. See Engle, supra note 22.
61. It is beyond the scope of this article to map the myriad ways in which the Other is effaced.
One example which has gained increased attention is the case of AIDS and the discourses which
construct it as an "African" disease. See C. Patton, "From Nation to Family: Containing
'African AIDS"' in A. Parker, ed.,Nationalisms andSexualities (New York: Routledge, 1992).
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deconstructive reading of the social circumstances in which the practices
themselves occur or of the circumstances in which the colonial discourses
are produced. One area of major concern and interest so far as "female
genital mutilation" is concerned is the creation of tropes and signifiers to
deal with the "fact" or "problem" of women's fundamental role in the
practices in question and in their deep insertion in cultural practices,
which define, inter alia, gender roles and identity of which the metropoli-
tan West and the mainstream feminist discourse which circulates there
disapproves.
The reality of "female genital mutilation" is that in most, but not all,
instances, the procedure itself is performed by women on women with the
active involvement of the female members of the woman's family or
kinship group." In many cases involvement of women is not simply part
of the "cultural" practice or framework in a narrow sense but involves the
acceptance and internalization of deeply-embedded cultural and reli-
gious beliefs. 61 It is thus important to engage in a careful and wary
deconstruction of all of the elements which might constitute the textual
background against which the practices of "female genital mutilation"
occur. To take two brief examples, it must be noted that in many cases,
for the women who perform these procedures, the income from these
activities is an important, if not a sole, source of income. It is not possible
to begin an analysis of women's implication in the practices in question
without a careful study of the political economy within global capitalism
under and within which the practices occur, taking into account in
particular the ways in which value and labour are themselves subjected
to gendered divisions. Secondly, but at the same time, the context of these
practices cannot be understood unless the "religious" nature of the
phenomena is carefully examined.
While it is important, if not vital, to clearly underline, as most Western
discussions now do, that the practice is not a part of the doctrine or
approved dominant practices of the Islamic faith, in order to avoid the
almost inevitable bigotry which comprises "our" construction of a
monolithic and terroristic Islam,' it is also important to realize that no
62. See supra note 15.
63. For a detailed and critical study of the role of women in some of these cultural
circumstances, see N. Sadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World (Boston:
Beacon Books, 1980); F. Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of
Women's Rights in Islam (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1991). For a postmodern reading of
the difference here, see L. Abu-Odeh, "Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Considering the
Differences" (1992) 26 New England L. Rev. 1527.
64. See A. Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise (New York:
Routledge, 1992).
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religion is limited to those doctrines or practices which have official
approval. Religion in this sense becomes and is a highly complex,
contextualized lived reality for those involved. If women practice "fe-
male genital mutilation" because they believe that it is either expressly
commanded by their faith or because, more subtly, they believe that a
variety of religious doctrines and practices about female sexuality,
chastity, the family, marriage etc. in fact make the practice a necessity,
then to claim that the practice must be eradicated because it does not stand
up to official doctrinal scrutiny, is to make a claim which is unjust because
it must be incommensurable with the lived "religious" reality of the
women themselves. To assert an Islamic authority, from the outside, is to
efface and erase the alterity of the Other.
Conversely, and/or at the same time, the "politics" of Islam further
complicates any simple strategy of effacement through labeling. Argu-
ments about theology are complex, controversial and need to be first
understood on their own terms. However, they must also be understood,
or at least read, in other terms as well. Thus, theological interventions on
the question of "female genital mutilation" become more problematic
when an examination of the context reveals a complex power struggle in
which "religion" is but a part of the mix. For example, recent debates in
Egypt have included legal action by a human rights group against a well-
known Muslim cleric who declared that "female genital mutilation" is a
duty recommended by the Prophet Mohammed.65 The cleric in question,
Sheikh Gad Al Haq, is the religious leader of Al Azhar University, the
leading higher education center for Islam in Egypt. While this debate
might at first blush appear to be a typical struggle between "domestic"
human rights groups and "conservative" religious forces over the issue of
"female genital mutilation", the situation is more subtle and complex. Al
Azhar University serves as a key site of so-called "Muslim fundamental-
ist" opposition to and foment against the "secular" Mubarak government,
which, of course, has not hesitated to invoke other authorities within
Islam to counter the University's growing power and influence.66 When
the regional and international dimensions of "Islamic fundamentalism"
are factored in, as they must be, the very ideas of "Islam", "Egypt" or
"female genital mutilation" no longer give, if they ever did, access to any
epistemological safe harbour. At the same time, it is important to note
67
65. A. Sipress, "Cleric Sued for Backing Female Circumcision" Sydney Morning Herald (14
April 1995) 6.
66. J. Lancaster, "University Constrains Mubarak's Power" Guardian Weekly (23 April
1995) 19.
67. See discussion below att Part IV.
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that to claim that because this is part of present practice calls for its
elimination are by definition indicative of a cultural insensitivity, is to
seek to efface the Other in another way. Claims of cultural relativity in this
context deny the complexity and mutability of culture and religion in
much the same way as the claims they criticize.
However, metropolitan discourses on the subject of "female genital
mutilation", particularly those which seek to abolish and/or criminalize
the practice, suffer from a much cruder form of injustice. These criticisms
of the practices associated with "female genital mutilation", when faced
with the "fact" of women's apparently free and voluntary participation in
the practices, by way of reply, often resort to a simplistic universalizing
signifier like "patriarchy" and a concomitant psychological explanatory
mechanism-"false consciousness". In more or less subtle explanations
of the apparently contradictory phenomenon of the "femaleness" of the
practices of "female genital mutilation", Western feminists and human
rights activists argue that women in the "Third World" are victimized by
the cultural constructs of patriarchal discursive practices which operate
in a hegemonic way to "force" women to "voluntarily" accept and
participate in the discourses which enslave, torture and mutilate them.
Whatever grain of truth or even explanatory panacea may be found in
the concept of "false consciousness" and its derivatives in the metropoli-
tan discourses on this subject, they operate quite clearly to provide an
explanation which satisfies Western interpretive practices and models
while at the same time reducing the Other Woman to a doubly subservient
and objectified status. Not only is She victimized by the patriarchal
hegemony of her own culture, but she becomes an object, a sociological
or anthropological topic of interest to be explained, "understood" and
thereby effaced. The deployment and employment of "false conscious-
ness", "hegemony", "internalization" and other constructs of Western
disciplinarity is another tragic example of the erasure of the Other by
turning her into an object explicable by reference to Eurocentric discur-
sive tactics.
Virtually no attempt is made to place the practices associated with
"female genital mutilation" into frames of reference which would permit
the Other to speak of the complexities of her "identity". How much
recognition, however tentative and hesitant, is given by Western dis-
course here to the idea that "gender" itself may be subjected to a number
and variety of cultural meanings? While there is in fact some recognition
in postmodern interventions into the field of "gender studies" of the social
constructedness and contingent nature of "our" understandings of "gen-
der", Western interventions into debates on the topic of "female genital
mutilation" seem constantly to revert to a foundational norm of gender,
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an irreducible core meaning among all the contingencies, beyond which
we will not allow our conception of gender to escape. This logos of
gender, identified and identifiable by the metaphysical presence of
"Woman", especially in the political and legal interventions in the area of
"female genital mutilation", is not uncoincidentally, symmetrical with
the logos, the logistic border which we draw around "us" and "them". The
limit, the unjust limitation placed on the call to justice, is precisely drawn
around and within the "Third World", a place where gender cannot be
allowed to speak or be heard unless it undergoes a translation which will
make the Other commensurable and which will at the same time make the
Other disappear under the guise of a violent pretense of Justice. Further,
it is drawn around the physical inscription of the female Other body, a
removal and an absence, greater than any "lack" of Western psychoana-
lytic theory and practice. It is the limit, the border, the boundary of a lack,
the present delimitation of absence which so effaces the female Other of
the "Third World" that she canvot even be eognized, rinscribed by her
"sisters" except as the Other, lacking even the lack, more lacking, beyond
desire, beyond desiring, justice.
Thus even when there is a recognition of the complexity involved in
gender construction, the recognition must always involve a call to
Western "justice".
Although infibulation can be seen as a means to control female sexuality
and subordinating women, it is important to recognize that the act of
infibulation determines the gender identity of women. After infibulation
girls acquire a new identity: they have become virgins. They are now ready
for marriage and able to give their husbands children. Girls who are not
infibulated will probably not find husbands. In most cases they will
become outcasts.
68
Yet Van Der Kwaak concludes that the practice must be eliminated. This
does not mean that she is "wrong" in her conclusion. Rather, it means that
for all her attention to the complexities of gender identity, she ends by
adopting what might be described as a Western frame. In fact, the issue
68. A. Van Der Kwaak, "Female Circumcision and Gender Identity: Questionable Alliance?"
(1992) 35 Soc. Sci. Med. 777. It is important to note that the concept of gender identity is
extremely vital and complex. Not only must care be taken to avoid colonizing discourse and
analyses, but it is crucial to place the issue in an appropriate context with consideration of
culturally appropriate criteria, of which one is clearly the processes of identity associated with
the "other" gender. Some ethnographic studies, for example, point to the fact that "female
genital mutilation" or other physically intrusive and painful initiation rites often occur in
cultures where some form of genital operation is also performed on the male initiate. See J.
Brown, "A Cross-Cultural Study of Female Initiation Rites" (1963) 65 Am. Anthro. 837. It is
important, therefore, to see "gender" as equally constructed in referential terms, reflecting the
interdependency which marks all textual practices.
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of gender identity in some countries is indeed more complex in relation
to "female genital mutilation" than Van Der Kwaak's Somali study
indicates it may be in that country. In Egypt, for example, the practice
appears to be less wide-spread and even among women who have
undergone the procedure, there is striking evidence that issues such as
gender identity, procreation and family life are more complex than
reference to the centrality of "female genital mutilation" would permit.69
Again, this does not mean that one is "wrong" and the other, the Other,
is "right", for we are speaking of/about justice, beyond right and wrong.
Rather, it simply suggests the importance of always reading warily, of
one's obligation and responsibility to do so. It is our obligation here to
read and to see and to hear "female genital mutilation" as a series of
complex social practices and signifiers which circulate in many other
practices and signifiers to produce mutable and mutating mutual social
texts.
3. Metropolitan Discourses and the Body of the Law
But in addition to failing on the subtle analysis of the issues of "gender"
as a colonial intervention in domestic discourses, Western interventions
fail on another front. In their rush to condemn and criminalize the Other
Woman, many participants in the Western debates around the issue fail
to intervene from a perspective which offers a deconstructive, justice-
inspired critique of the discourses and practices from which they them-
selves speak of "justice". Nowhere is this more clear in the battle to
intervene at the level of the appropriate and acceptable signifier to be
invoked, deployed and employed as the sign of justice.
Without going into a detailed historical and semiotic analysis of the
debate, it is readily noticeable to the reader that some refer to the practices
in question as "female circumcision"; others use the technical, medical
term "infibulation"; some invoke a seeming combination of the two,
"female genital surgeries"; and finally, some choose what is now seen as
the most "acceptable" term in Western discourse "female genital mutila-
tion". What is at stake in each deployment, each signifying debate, is
clearly a battle over the characterization of a complex and nuanced set of
social and cultural practices which will best capture the "reality" of what
is "happening". In other words, the terminological debate is occurring in
the rhetorical sphere of political and ideological phenomenology. At the
same time, the linguistic strategy is also to obtain and maintain a
69. See N. Atiya, Khul-Khaal: Five Egyptian Women Tell Their Stories (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1982).
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canonical textual interpretive status, to define and to confine, to establish
the boundaries and borders which in turn define strategies of exclusion
and alterity.
Briefly, those who describe the question as dealing with "female
circumcision" import into the debate the primacy of the "religious"
character of the practice. Those who use technical terms like "infibulation"
or the more generic "female genital surgeries" wish to bring to the fore
the "medical" analogy which treats the practice from a more detached,
apolitical and even scientific perspective. Finally, those who use the
phrase "female genital mutilation" seek to shift the focus in two ways.
First and most importantly, they want to invoke the harsh lived reality of
the "victims" of the procedures. Second, they want to use the graphic
"mutilation" to disarm the placating effects of the terminology deployed
in the other cases. "Mutilation" stands in stark contrast to the noble,
sacred connotations which follow from "circumcision". It also belies and
negates any idea that what occurs and is being spoken of is any way
"scientific" or "surgical". A necessary consequence of the double strat-
egy behind the use of "female genital mutilation" is to underline and
highlight the centrality of "gender" to the discourse. It is the "female"
who is being "mutilated". Her genitalia are the object, her gender and her
sexuality are being targeted. Here we also in interesting ways return to the
issue of women's "complicity" in the practice. What is being targeted,
written and inscribed graphically on the body of the women is the Law of
the Father which describes, defines and delimits the female as that which
is not, the sex which is not one-genitalia removed so that her defining
lack can be graphically noted. Her only hope for definition, the only
signifying function she can hope to fulfill, will now depend on the
opening written by the man, to enter her and inscribe her only and fully
as the bearer of his meaning.7°
At the same time, however, to write female genital mutilation, rather
than "female genital mutilation" as I have tried to do throughout this
intervention in an attempt to defer the undeferrable moment of judging,
is not only to rush to judgment with the universalizing discourse of a "law
of the Father"'" but it is also to forget a series of texts and practices which
are submerged in the discourse here described but also subsumed under
the rubric of "female genital mutilation". In particular, the emphasis
placed in many discussions in the metropolis on the idea of "sexuality"
70. See L. Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1985);
L. Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1985).
71. For a complex and nuanced expose of this problem, see G. Spivak, "French Feminism in
an International Frame" in In Other Worlds (New York: Routledge, 1988) at 134.
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may inadvertently import another level of Western imperialist discursive
concepts without further problematizing and interrogating them, in a
deconstructive turn to justice.
The idea of "female genital mutilation", particularly as "mutilation".
carries with it in Western interventions ideas of sexuality, sexual pleasure
and sexual freedom for women which may themselves be products of the
cultural specificities of the feminist West. Even the medical literature on
the subject begins to fall prey to this danger and in turn serves to support
the unquestioning application of a universal ideal of sexual pleasure,
choice and freedom. Thus, both feminist and medical interventions72
place a certain emphasis on the real obstetric and gynecological compli-
cations and horrors which often follow the practices in question. These
arguments are then extended to the issues of sexual dysfunctionality
which can follow upon the closure of the vaginal opening and upon the
"biological" fact that the sensitivity of the clitoris is the source of primary
female sexual pleasure and climax. The removal of the clitoris which is
common to many types of practices under the title of "female genital
mutilation" then results primarily in the removal of the possibility of
sexual pleasure for the woman. This is the primary strategy of patriarchal
torture73: to deny, to remove, to excise, to/from the female body any
possibility of sexual function not oriented towards male pleasure and
recreation, to silence even the possibility of the unspeakable pleasure.
On this question there appears to be little debate, although it is not
impossible to argue that the biological "fact" of the location of sexual
pleasure in the clitoris is perhaps itself part of a more complex construc-
tion of biology, physiology and sexuality in the West than we are at
present willing to consider. Arguments about non-genital sexuality from
para- or quadriplegics would, for example, indicate that the understand-
able feminist focus on the clitoris as a site of domination and liberation
is itself limited in its universal applicability, even to "women". In this
example, the characterization of female sexual pleasure as solely or
primarily clitoral and the absence thereof as "mutilation" centers the
signifier "mutilation" in a very particular world view. However, one area
in which there is room for a deconstructive critique which is virtually
absent from current interventions and calls for justice, is in the assertion,
both explicit and implicit, that the physical pain, the trauma caused to the
body, the sexual dysfunction and the physical impossibility of experienc-
72. See supra note 15.
73. For an interesting reading of this issue in the metropolitan West, see M. Janssen-Jurreit,
"Clitoridectomy the Western Way" in Sexism: The Male Monopoly on History and Thought
(New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1982) at 239.
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ing sexual pleasure, or at least clitoral stimulation, climax, together result
in serious psychological damage to the women who undergo the procedure.
Indeed, while the medical literature is somewhat ambiguous on the
issue, it may well be the majority view that "female genital mutilation"
does not in and of itself result in psychological trauma to the women.
7 4
Many of the manifestations of psychological or psychiatric disorders
seem to come from women who have undergone the procedures and
subsequently immigrated to the West. In such cases, particularly in
circumstances of traumatic dislocation and the refugee status of life in
Diaspora, it is extremely difficult to attribute mental or psychological
disorders to a single source such as "female genital mutilation". In
addition, it sometimes appears to be the case that the psychological
difficulty in question is not related to "female genital mutilation" in an
isolated sense, but rather refers to its effects on sexuality and marital
relations. Instead of focusing on the lack of female sexual pleasure as the
primary "psycIologica" yesult in suclh cases, s13me wnmel see them-
selves as sexual "failures" because the physical and psychic problems
have an adverse effect on marital sexual relations. Thus, one woman
explained her pain this way:
I'd like to be a complete woman but I'm not .... I'm not a complete woman
because... Sometimes I'm afraid I'm not woman enough for my husband
.. that I can't satisfy him.75
In such circumstances, it is not just problematic but is dangerous and
unfair to offer a simple and singular causal response to the issue of the
Other woman and to her sexuality as inscribed in "female genital
mutilation" practices and especially in Western feminist or human rights
interventions which seek to apply neo/post-colonial imperialist tropes to
"her" "reality".
This diagnostic difficulty is exacerbated when one begins to consider
the possible influence of metropolitan frames of reference in the process
of the diagnosis itself. Are concepts of psychological trauma and the
etiology of "mental illness" universal concepts or do they flow from a
clearly defined set of historical, institutional discourses situated within
74. See Mustafa, supra note 15 at 304, who points out that there is no clinical evidence of
psychiatric disorders attributable to the practice but who then argues that this might be
attributable to the position of women in the culture, so that the absence of professional clinical
symptoms may not be easily equated with the absence of trauma. See also, Lowenstein, supra
note 15 at 418, who reports on the absence of evidence of psychological trauma, and Gordon,
supra note 15 at 7, who states that "Evaluation of the immediate and long-term psychological
impact of the operations has not been addressed .. " But see M. Badawi, "Epidemiology of
Female Sexual Castration in Cairo, Egypt" (July-August 1989) The Truth Seeker 32.
75. SBS Television, Act of Love (The Cutting Edge, 29 June 1993) [broadcast].
342 The Dalhousie Law Journal
the complex matrix of modernity in the West, of which the colonial
tradition is a part?7 6 If we work on the wary assumption that all of our
frames of reference must themselves be subjected to a deconstructive
scrutiny, then the psychological traumas apparently associated with
"female genital mutilation" may well themselves be attributed to the
position of women in the Diaspora and to the attitudes and significations
of the metropolitan knowledges of the woman in the Diaspora. This does
not mean that there are no adverse effects of "female genital mutilation"
nor does it in any way diminish the lived reality of the woman in Diaspora.
What it does is to interrogate our constructions of the trauma and pain as
yet other symptoms of the sick and diseased object who is the Other. In
other words, it suggests Other Words, a deconstructive appeal to self-
critical, problematizing, reflexivity to re-place and to re-situate the neo/
post-colonial imposition of meaning on/of the Other.
Without such a deconstructive, legal incision into the call for justice,
"we" run the risk of simply perpetuating the metropolitan discourses of
oppression, objectification and effacement. For example, in describing
the psychological reality of the North African immigrant worker in
France, Fanon focuses not only on "his" internal dynamic but on the way
in which the "French" medical discourse creates "the Arab" and reduces
him to a valueless object.
The pathology invented by the Arab does not interest us. It is a pseudo-
pathology. The Arab is a pseudo-invalid.... The medical staff discovers
the existence of a North African syndrome. Not experimentally, but on the
basis of an oral tradition. The North African takes his place in this
asymptomatic syndrome and is automatically put down as undisciplined
(cf. medical discipline), inconsequential (with reference to the law accord-
ing to which every symptom implies a lesion), and insincere...77
If we were to add to Fanon's analysis even a cursory examination of the
psycho-social construction of sexuality, the female, the Exotic Other etc.,
it would become clear to us that any rush to judgment in relation to
problems of a psychiatric or psychological nature is bound to fall short of
the requirements of hearing the unuttered and unutterable cries of the
Other for justice.
76. See M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception (New
York: Pantheon, 1973); M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason (New York: Pantheon, 1965).
77. F. Fanon, "The Problem of the Colonized" in Toward The African Revolution (1967) at
9-10. For a strong critique of Fanon's construction of alterity, see R. Chow, Writing Diaspora:
Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies (Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1993) at 30.
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But the turn in Western discourses to medical, psychiatric explana-
tions and frames carries with it another more interesting turn in textual
practice, this time away from these same frames. This turn away, to which
I now turn, in an attempted return to the unheard and unheedable call to
justice, is also deeply connected with the ideas and explanations based in
the "false consciousness" type dismissals of the phenomenon of women's
central role in the practices of "female genital mutilation". It is also
deeply related to the arguments about and around the appropriate deploy-
ment of signifiers in the metropolis and in my decision to adopt what I
believe to be the more self-limiting sign "female genital mutilation".
As I have already argued, the move away from the medicalized
phrases---"female circumcision", "infibulation" etc., and "female genital
surgeries"-is meant, in part at least, to contest the apparent objectivity
and sterility of these medico-religious descriptives and to insert a counter-
narrative which is in essence and in form, woman-centered. Yet there is
a disturbing, although it must be noted again, not universal, tendenciy in
such debates and deployments to ignore the centrality of the very
discourses which are discarded not only in the construction of rhetorical
devices which support arguments from the opposed point of view (e.g. the
use of the psychological damage issue) but in the lived construction and
oppression of women in the metropolitan centers as well as in the "Third
World".
In other words, medicine in general and "surgery" in particular are
practices which have played and continue to play a key role in the graphic
inscription of the Law of the Father on the female body. From the
frequency of episeotomy and Cesarean sections in obstetrical practices to
the role of cosmetic surgery to achieve and maintain some ideal of
"beauty", surgery continues to write the body of the law on the body of
the woman. At the same time, traditional forms of psychiatric practice,
particularly the Freudian practice of psychoanalysis78 have been deeply
integrated in the creation of the "female" not just in the realm of the
isolated professional discourse but in the broad-based circulation of
concepts and ideas/idealizations which form part of the collective con-
scious and unconscious. Indeed, the two domains share a common origin
in the inscription of the female body with a complex set of social
meanings, always largely signified by a tearing, a sundering, a ripping, a
removal (of ovaries, of the "phallus") which writes the woman as an
absence, a lack, a mutilated (not) male.
78. See Irigaray, supra note 70; N. Chodorow, Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); S. Garner, The (M)Other Tongue (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985).
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For example, surgery itself as a separate specialty within the medical
disciplines originated in its modem form as a result of the extensive and
almost exclusive use of the female body as its experimental site.
79
Woman, the Other of science and of medicine, has always been the object
of surgery, reduced to that which is scientifically knowable.
Indeed, this reduction of Woman to an objectified alterity finds its
most telling incarnation in the conjunction of surgery and psychological
knowledges. In the second half of the 19th century, as surgery became
safer and concern about mental instability, particularly of females, rose,
"female genital mutilation" in the form of clitoridectomy became a
common practice in the treatment of various "mental illnesses" (e.g.
promiscuity) in women. Even after the practice fell into disrepute in
England, it was still recommended in medical texts in the United States
until 1925 and later still it was a recommended treatment for masturbation."
Not only must appeals to medical concepts to support the elimination
of "female genital mutilation" take into account these historical roots of
current practices, but more importantly they must account for an apparent
double standard in their treatment of "medical" or "surgical" "mutila-
tions" as practiced in the "Third World" or on "Third World" women and
their attitudes to the "mutilation" of women in the metropolitan center.
Thus while critics such as Bordo 81 analyze and decry the practices
associated with plastic or cosmetic surgery and other constructions of the
physicality of the female form,82 their solutions to the problem and their
analysis of the role and function of women in internalizing the values
associated with the practices and in submitting to the practices, lack the
degree of epistemological certainty and rhetorical fervour associated
with political and legal interventions in the debates over "female genital
mutilation". This double standard, which creates a doubling and an
effacement of the Other woman, is symptomatic of the failure of Western
discursive interventions in the construction of the female body in/of the
"Third World" to engage in any critical self-examination.
By way of a brief example, Bordo offers a narrative about her
intervention into a debate about plastic surgery. In addition to demon-
strating how the media deal with discourses they do not understand, her
79. See A. Daly, Women Under The Knife: A History of Surgery (London: Hutchinson
Radius, 1991).
80. See ibid. especially at 146-84. It is interesting to note that much of the controversy
surrounding the procedure in England concerned not its appropriateness per se but the limits
of its appropriate application.
81. Seesupra note58.
82. See e.g. F. Mascia-Lees & P. Sharpe, Tattoo, Torture, Mutilation, and Adornment: The
Denaturalization of the Body in Culture and Text (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1992).
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story offers a cautionary tale about how "relativizing" and "equality"
based arguments can in fact be deployed to silence a deeper social
critique.83 At the same time, however, Bordo reveals the deeper
problematics of much Western discourse on the topic. In her intervention
on the subject of cosmetic surgery, she is careful to tell us that she offered
"... my cautions about the politics of female body transformation (none
of them critical of individuals contemplating plastic surgery, all of them
of a cultural nature) ... 84
Her analysis and intervention from and as "someone who is frequently
interviewed by local television and newspaper reporters", 85 in other
words, as an "expert" who has achieved this "status" by her involvement
in the creation and circulation of discourses which gain their authority and
expertise through their institutional situation in the University and their
circulation and replication in the media. She is careful to limit her
intervention to the "cultural", perhaps out of concern for her less enlight-
ened sisters who are contemplating cosmetic surgery, or from a concern
to address the broader social issues which might otherwise be ignored in
"popular" discussions of the issues or for any number of other reasons. At
first blush, her qualification and reticence are to be admired. She can in
no way be seen to be entering into any discourse which would either
blame the victim or individualize a social phenomenon. On a closer
examination, however, Bordo's position becomes somewhat more prob-
lematic. She fails here to address an issue of some importance in the
debate over the surgical and sexual graphic writing of the female body,
"consent", a hesitation which is not shared by some of her colleagues in
their interventions on the issue of "female genital mutilation". Moreover,
Bordo cannot be excused for her decision on the grounds that she wishes
to limit her critique to the real cultural level and therefore she need not
address the issue of those who are in fact contemplating cosmetic surgery.
By doing what she does Bordo offers a vision of the "cultural" which,
while complex and seemingly contingent, is at base frozen in a static
hegemony within which there is no room for political struggle or at least
no room for any political struggle which might engage the "cultural" on
any terrain Bordo finds unacceptable. Thus, there is no room in Bordo's
construction of "culture" and the politics of the creation of the female
form therein, for those who are in fact considering cosmetic surgery. For
some reason the explanations, situations and experiences of these women
83. Supra note 58 at 259-60.
84. Ibid. at 259.
85. Ibid.
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can play no role in either our "understanding" of the cultural practice of
cosmetic surgery or in the construction of that or other cultural practices.86
In addition, Bordo offers no space within the "culture" for practices
which graphically inscribe the body in an attempt to wrest political
control over such practices away from dominant texts. For example, a
recent upsurge in body piercing, including the piercing of female genita-
lia, can be read in this deconstructive light as such an attempt to re-
eroticize the body of the Other in Western cultures. For Bordo, however,
such practices can never escape from a hegemonic and one-dimensional
"culture" which encodes and oppresses the female body at every turn. The
"cultural" is then reduced to a phenomenon to be studied, created both by
those who create the images and by those who create the academic
discourses which analyze them. The female is at once reduced to a set of
images produced in a purely external fashion and studied objectively by
a careful and informed critique of the images and at the same time effaced
as any other kind of participant in the "culture". Bordo, in the end, does
to her "own" culture what many analyses of "female genital mutilation"
do to other cultures, she freezes it, dissects it, and removes all signs of life
from it. She writes about culture and kills it ever so softly. Any strategy
which offers a deconstructive reading of "female genital mutilation"
must strive to situate itself and its discursive subject within a cultural
frame which articulates not strictly patrolled and enforced boundaries but
which creates, permits and encourages sites of leakage, of seepage, of
fluid interchange between "cultures" and signifiers, which brings texts
together-con-texts.
What Bordo forgets and foregoes, and what we must remember and
through which our interventions must be mediated, is a series of similari-
ties which can be found in cultural critiques dealing with the intersection
of ideological and "surgical" practices around the idea of the centrality of
the body of the Other. This set of similarities, for the sake of brevity and
simplicity, as well as for the sake of the practical restraints which will
always inform and delimit a deconstructive search for the unwritable sign
of justice, results in a set of cultural practices and knowledges which must
at one and the same time write the body of the Other and erase that body
because of the sexual and ultimately legal challenge which that incorpo-
86. I have made a similar criticism of Bordo elsewhere. See D. Fraser, "Madonna, Sex and
the House of Lords" (1993) 3 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 1. For a powerful
critique of Bordo, see D. Kennedy, "Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of
Domination" (1992) 26 New England L. Rev. 1309 at 1375.
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ration of alterity poses to the possibility of our ability and desire to forget
the impossible, unforgettable which is justice.87
4. Blind Justice
More particularly, what is required in all readings which are
deconstructively self-aware and therefore sufficiently wary and contin-
gent in order to begin an analysis into appeals for justice, is a knowledge
of the "anxiety" which must inform "our" discussions. This anxiety is
itself manifested, I believe, not just in the political and legal debates
which will be examined below, but even or especially in the choice and
"deployment" of the signifier "mutilation".
Not only does the signifier portray the "reality" of the practices in
question and their effects, but I would suggest, however tentatively, it
betrays and describes our collective psycho-social anxieties over all
practices and texts which seek to inscribe the body and to efface or
otherwise betray alterity and identity, or more precisely, the trace which
lies between and around them. It is not coincidental that one can find a
literal and deeper psychic inscription of a connection or trace which links
castration anxiety, which is clearly central to some (male) concerns88
about circumcision. Indeed, our apparent blindness to these connections
and their implication for the debates around the topic of "female genital
mutilation", may in fact be more deeply understood as an Oedipal
response-a self-blinding-to the deep fears with which we come to the
practices in question. In fact, our blindness to blindness is itself a barrier
which serves to assist in the forgetting of forgetting which is central to a
deconstruction of our quest for "justice".89
But there is at work here a different blindness, a blindness which
contains a trace of justice, engraved like an image on a non-functional
retina, an image of the impossible justice, of truly blind justice. It is not
by accident that Alice Walker's and Pratibha Parmar's project on "female
genital mutilation" is entitled Warrior Marks: Female Genital Mutilation
and the Sexual Blinding of Women. Comparing her own blinding by her
87. See P. Cheah, D. Fraser & J. Grbich, Thinking Through The Body of the Law (forthcom-
ing) [hereinafter Thinking Through] for a series of essays dealing with various aspects of this
and related issues. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine these other discourses which
inscribe the body of the Other within Metropolitan signifying practices.
88. And female anxieties in a more complex, but perhaps even more central way. See Irigaray,
supra note 70.
89. See S.L. Gilman, The Case of Sigmund Freud: Medicine and Identity at the fin-de-sicle
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) at 206. See also J. Derrida, Memoirs of the
Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
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brother when she was a child, Walker speaks and writes of the inscription
on the body of the young girl "female genital mutilation" not as a tragedy
but as a "warrior mark" from which she will learn the lessons of
empowerment. From the mourning comes growth, from the blinding, in-
sight.90 For the process, act, text of mourning is the text of the impossible
gift of the Other, of justice.9' This insight/in-sight into justice in the
present context takes on multiple aspects. The shared vision of the
unseeable Other (God)92 here becomes the key to justice and responsibil-
ity, blind justice, the ethical moment. "Blindness of the letter and by the
letter. Here is a symbol: the blindfolded synagogue."9 3
The memory here is not of the Oedipal fear of castration or of the
blindness which is the loss of meaning, of the ability to write, inscribe,
circumscribe, but the memory of the blind as witness to the unseeable
Other, 94 the "warrior mark" as witness to the impossibility of memory and
forgetting. The moment when mourning can become the shedding of the
tears of the blind who have not forgotten the forgetting of the Other.95
It is important, then, not to forget about forgetting. This is the limit and
the trace beyond/within the limit which circumscribes "our" project. This
is also the trace and the limit which circumscribes our relations with the
Other-a relationship which is marked by a connection ruptured in a
violent and memorable way which is forgotten yet in some cases written
as a memory, a trace of alterity on the body, circumscribed in circumci-
sion. As a basic possible, impossible possible, we stand before law and
justice, having committed the crime of the law, of writing, of speaking the
blasphemous "truth" of "justice", of attempting to uncircumscribe that
which is graphically inscribed in the Other. Therefore,
... the denial I want constantly to oppose.., in other words to the eternal
survivress, to the theologic program or maternal figure of absolute knowl-
edge for which the surprise of no avowal is possible, and this sentence says
that 'one always asks for pardon when one writes', so as to leave suspended
90. Supra note 18, at 18-19.
91. See Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man, supra note 28.
92. See E. Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas" in R. Cohen, ed., Face to Face with
Levinas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986) at 21. "The interhuman is thus
an interface: a double axis where what is 'of the world' qua phenomenological intelligibility
is juxtaposed with what is 'not of the world' qua ethical responsibility. It is in this ethical
perspective that God must be thought, and not in the ontological perspective of our being-there
or of some supreme being and creator correlative to the world, as traditional metaphysics often
held. God, as the God of alterity and transcendence, can only be understood in terms of that
interhuman dimension. ...."
93. Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, supra note 89 at 18.
94. Ibid. at 112. Each time a divine punishment is cast down upon sight in order to signify the
mystery of election, the blind become witnesses to the faith.
95. Ibid. at 127.
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the question of knowing if one is finally asking pardon in writing for some
earlier crime, blasphemy, or perjury or if one is asking for pardon for the
crime, blasphemy, or perjury in which consists presently the act of writing,
the simulacrum of avowal needed by the perverse overbidding of the crime
to exhaust evil.. 96
Our search for the truth of "female genital mutilation", our responsi-
bility then, is inextricably entwined in our own matrix of crime, injustice
and the Law in the search for an effaceable Other. Before turning to an
examination of the processes which create and circulate law's discourses,
we must then "admit" our crime of forgetting, we must allow it to enter,
to be admitted into the debate, we must confess the circumscription of all
"our" interventions by and in the body of the Other. We must confess the
anxiety which is inscribed in the "mutilation" of the Self in the Other. We
must examine how our anxieties about the sexualized Other inform our
discursive interventions, how they "mutilate" and "circumcise" that
Other in our graven image. This is the blasphemy of injustice. It is perhaps
then that we can join in an attempted recognition of the unrecognizable
written on/in the body of the (M)Other, for in fact, we always speak of
circumcision.97 In this sense, we search the unfindable (M)Other in an
attempt to recover identity and justice before the body of law which is the
Father's law of the body.
... or Mummy if you prefer, which cuts across everything, a synchrony
running the risk of hiding what's essential, that is that the restrained
confession will not have been my fault but hers, as though the daughter of
Zipporah had not only committed the crime of my circumcision but one
more still, later, the first playing the kickoff, the original sin against me,
but to reproduce itself and hound me, call me into question, me, a whole
life long, to make her avow, her, in me.9"
Now, if ever, is the time to turn to the inscription of the Other in the
effacing discursive matrix of the Law. To seek justice with/out the Law.
96. See J. Derrida, "Circumfession" in G. Bennington & J. Derrida, eds., Jacques Derrida
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 46.
97. Ibid. "Circumcision, that's all I've ever talked about, consider the discourse on the limit,
margins, marks, marches, etc., the closure, the ring (alliance and gift), the sacrifice, the writing
of the body, the pharmakos excluded or cut off, the cutting/sewing of Glas, the blow and the
sewing back up, whence the hypothesis according to which it's that, circumcision, that, without
knowing it, never talking about it in passing, as though it were an example, that I was always
speaking or having spoken, unless, another hypothesis, circumcision itself were merely an
example of the thing I was talking about, yes but I have been, I am and always will be, me and
not another, circumcised..." Ibid. at 70-71.
98. Ibid. at 73-74. See also, L. trigaray, Et 1' Une ne bouge pas sans I'Autre (1979) at 21. "Et
pourquoi me serait-il imposre d'autre blessure? N'avais-je drjA mestes lvres? Et ce corps
ouvert sur ce que jamais nous n'aurions achev6 de nous donner. De nous dire. Cette faille de
silence ou nous rnenvelopper sans cesse pour renaitre. Ou nous ressentir pour, encore et encore,
devenir femmes, et mbres."
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III. The Criminalization of the Other:
Circumscribing the Law
It is in Diaspora that the issue of "female genital mutilation" and the
criminalization of the procedures associated with the phenomena has
recently arisen. As the effects of the neo/post-colonial globe inscribe the
"Third World" more and more graphically, diasporic communities have
established themselves in "the West"-Europe, North America and
Australia. In fact, the United States, Canada and Australia are the
countries with the largest "refugee" populations. This invasion of the
Other, with her cultural practices and heritage, has brought the differend
between "them" and "us" to a heightened level of awareness. Although
each country of "the West" has had varied experiences with Diaspora,
what has been shared is a constant and consistent failure to interrogate the
nature of Diaspora in the neo/post-colonial world in terms of the aporia
of justice. This failure of critical self-examination is epitomized in "the
West" by the example of Australia where the issue of "female genital
mutilation" is currently giving rise to heated public debate.
In the last part of 1993 and the early months of 1994 there were strong
calls for governmental intervention to outlaw "female genital mutilation"
in Australia. Those seeking state action included Parliamentarians at both
state and federal levels, lawyers' groups, the Australian Medical Associa-
tion and ordinary citizens. Thus, calls for the criminalization of "female
genital mutilation" circulated in official and unofficial domains, in the
professional discourses of law and medicine, and in the fora of popular,
or at least Parliamentary, democracy. Even a cursory examination of
these discourses and the interactions between and among them reveals the
many ways in which "moral panics"99 and criminalization as social
discursive practices are created and circulate in a complex matrix of
social meaning. Such an examination also reveals, I believe, the funda-
mental lack of self-awareness and blindness to the discourse of justice
which characterizes not just this area but all metropolitan interventions in
the "Third World", especially when the "Third World" is found in the
diasporic communities located in neo/post-colonial centers such as
Australia. Let us turn to such a brief examination to uncover the forgetting
which characterizes both "official" and "unofficial" discourses which lay
claims to justice.
On 21 February 1994, the member for Adelaide, Ms. Worth, inter-
vened in the House of Representatives (the lower House of the bicameral
99. See S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).
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Federal Parliament), to call for government intervention and action
against "female genital mutilation" which she characterized in her
opening comments as "the worst type of culturally acceptable assault"' °
and "this sickening practice".' 0' While condemning the practice and
urging the governmentto live upto its obligations under internationallaw
and as the protector of all Australians, Worth nonetheless was forced to
concede that the "practice of mutilation in Australia is shrouded in
secrecy and evidence is mainly anecdotal. Documentation is limited...". 02
This did not prevent her from relying upon such evidence and hearsay
from unidentified social workers to support her call for action. In this she
was joined by the member for Macquarie (Ms. Deahm) and the member
for Moncrieff (Mrs. Sullivan) who also urged federal government ac-
tion.l0 3 For Deahm, the issue is not one of culture per se but rather "[i]t is
about patriarchy, as so many of these traditions are.""
For Sullivan the problem is that because of the influx of immigrants the
issue is now "Australian".
While female genital mutilation is part of some cultures' tradition, no-one
is prepared to defend it publicly in Australia; nor are there any medical or
religious grounds for it. However, the fact remains that an increasing
number of Australian women and girls have to endure horrific lifelong
emotional and physical scars as a result of this barbaric mutilation of their
genitalia. 05
This "national" focus is continued by the member forLowe (Mrs. Easson)
who offers what for her and our other representatives seems to be nothing
more than a statement of the obvious.
Migrant settlement is a process of give and take. If Australia finds a certain
folk custom to be repulsive, a migrant has the duty to give this custom
away. This is the price to pay for our common good.' °0
These members are finally joined by Ms. Henzell (Capricornia) who
specifically rejects the "cultural relativity argument"'0 7 and invokes the
principle of equality as the basis upon which criminalization must be
enacted.
100. Australia Legislative Council, Hansard, (21 February 1994) at 892.
101. Ibid. at 893.
102. Ibid.
103. This is an issue of some importance since under the Australian Constitution, it is the
States, not the Commonwealth government, who are vested with primary jurisdiction in
criminal law matters.
104. Ibid. at 895.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid. at 896.
107. Ibid. at 898.
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It is not surprising, then, that we encounter here, in the federal
Parliament, the same discursive strategies and metaphors which inform
virtually all metropolitan debate on the subject of "female genital
mutilation". Here the final effect is to efface the Other by reducing her to
an almost complete alterity while at the same time holding out the
opposite, yet identical, fate of effacement through identity. The goal of
objectifying the Other is begun in the choice of discourse itself, to reduce
her to a "topic" to be discussed, an object who cannot speak or be heard
but who must rather be "represented". 108 The process continues along the
now familiar path of deploying female genital mutilation, without any
limiting restraining marks or traces, and is completed by the joint
inscription of the debate in terms of the Eurocentric modernist construct
of a decontextualized "equality" and then the writing, inscription of the
debate in terms of limitation, of exclusion, of barriers to entry, (of
infibulation) of the border between us and them, of the nation, in this case
"Australia", written, without borders of a just limitation, but simply
Australia, its own limit. Here the Diaspora never truly raises the question
of the border, 1°9 the presence of the Other in our midst, with her "folk
customs", even this characterization is bound to diminish and exclude
her. The border does not interrogate itself, this is not the moment to
inquire about, around, within the concept/construct/nation-Australia, not
"Australia". This is the time to close the border, to assimilate, to
eliminate, to criminalize, to exclude and to include, but ultimately to
efface. The border, the frame, the nation, are all super-inscribed, circum-
scribed within and without the text of the Other, a text which must, as it
is written in/on the body of the Other/Law, be excluded, barred from
entry. The question of the border, precisely, becomes the question/ing of
the Law, of limits and of transgression. It becomes, in other words, the
question in Other Words, the quest in/of/for justice, of the impossible, of
the possible, the un-limited, the aporia of justice.
This is why the site of the aporia of justice, the impossible gift and
obligation of our responsibility to/for the Other is always written in/on/
around the boundary. Deconstruction, the Law of aporia, must always
already transgress and incorporate. It patrols lines and sites of demarca-
tion which cannot be limited or inscribed except in a tentative fashion
because it is (un)limited by the haunting call of the impossible justice/
Other.
108. See Derrida, Of Grammatology, supra note 13.
109. See K. Tol6gari, "The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface" (1991) 1
Diaspora 87.
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A plural logic of the aporia thus takes shape. It appears to be paradoxical
enough so that the partitioning [partage] among multiple figures of aporia
does not oppose figures to each other, but instead installs the haunting of
the one in the other. In one case, the nonpassage resembles an imperme-
ability; it would stem from the opaque existence of an uncrossable border:
a door that does not open or that only opens according to an unlocatable
condition, according to the inaccessible secret of some shibboleth. Such is
the case for all closed borders (exempliarly during war). In another case,
the nonpassage, the impasse or aporia, stems from the fact that there is no
limit. There is not yet or there is no longer a border to cross, no opposition
between two sides: the limit is too porous, permeable, and indetermi-
nate.... Finally, the third type of aporia, the impossible, the antimony, or
the contradiction, is a nonpassage because its elementary milieu does not
allow for something that could be called passage, step, walk, gait, displace-
ment, or replacement, a kinesis in general. There is no more path .... The
impasse itself would be impossible.1 °
We find here the theme which returns again to haunt and infest
Australian (and other metropolitan) debates about "female genital muti-
lation"--the national identity. Let us read and write it again, "If Australia
finds a certain folk custom to be repulsive, a migrant has the duty to give
this custom away. This is the price to pay for our common good."'
IV. Bordering on (In)justice
Let us now read the ways in which the border guard lowers the barrier; let
us hear the barking of the dogs as they sniff out potential intruders; let us
listen to the siren calls of alarm as the intruder is sighted. But let us not
yet speak of justice.
The diminutive and diminishing "folk custom", something not of great
importance, belongs not to the modem state, that which we seek to
protect, but to the pre-modern "folk". Hear and read the imperialist
traditions of anthropology and ethnography as they come to the fore. But
this is not merely a process of diminution, it is also one of exclusion-
"repulsive". Hear now the echo of the primitive and our civilized reaction
to it. It repels us and we must repel it. No entry. The border is closed.
Who decides? The question is clear. No differend, no absence or
impossibility ofjudging, no possible impossibility here-when Australia
decides. No "Australia" here, open, tentative, aware of the possibility of
memory or justice. Australia. And this Other, this Woman who would
inscribe herself and Others with a text that is forbidden, she is not of, by
or in Australia. Her passport, her passage through the barrier is restricted,
110. Derrida, Aporias, supra note 14 at 20-21.
111. Australia, Hansard, supra note 100 at 896.
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her status as Other confirmed by the Law which has written her body as
Other and by the law of Australia, which/who stands now in judgment, no
passage through the portal, something with which She is intimately
familiar. The difficulty, the impossibility, of penetration, the pain asso-
ciated with the impossible intercourse with the Law of the Father.
Exclusion, inscription, infibulation. Law.
But there is hope, a visa is available within the vice of "justice", a
vision, a gaze which will efface her rejection as Other but which offers to
efface her again by recognizing her as identical. Justice is blind. It forgets
about forgetting just as she must forget about herself by giving this
custom away. She must make us the gift of self-effacement, it is after all
"the price to pay for our common good."' 12 But this is no gift at all. This
is not an aneconomic circulation outside the circulation of commodities
and surplus value." 3 This is a "price" to be paid for the common good. It
is the price to be paid for the elimination of alterity. This is perhaps a
greater barrier to entry than any "procedure". This is an entry tax, not a
gift, on alterity. This is (not) the price of justice. This is the inscription of
the body of the tax-payer,1 14 a taxing women.
The tenor of debate in the Legislature of Australia's most populous
state, New South Wales, is equally problematic. The charge towards an
explicit criminalization1"' of the practices associated with "female genital
mutilation" was lead by Franca Arena in the Legislative Council, the
Upper House of the bicameral New South Wales Legislature.
Not only does the move to criminalize "female genital mutilation"
have the support of both government and opposition but there is a heated
battle between the parties to see who can be the first to introduce the
legislation to concretize the rhetoric.'
16
112. Ibid.
113. See supra note 105.
114. See generally J. Grbich, "The Taxpayer's Body: Genealogies of Exertion" in Thinking
Through, supra note 87.
115. While it is beyond the specific and limited goals of this paper to engage in a detailed
technical legal argument about the issues in question, it is important to note that it is quite
beyond doubt that the procedures in question constitute assault causing grievous or actual
harm. Because there is no real question, in the Australian context, of them being described as
"1acceptable" medicalprocedures, the "issue" of consent becomes moot and because of the level
of harm caused to the body, "consent" is equally irrelevant to the legal context. See R. v. Brown
(1993), 2 W.L.R. 556.
116. See "Move to outlaw female mutilation" Sydney Telegraph Mirror (10 February 1994)
3; and S. Kirk & B. Zuel, "Ban on female mutilation soon" Sydney Morning Herald (3 March
1994) 5. The position in Victoria, the second most populous state is similar. See M. Magazanik,
"Wade may place ban on female circumcision" The [Melbourne] Age (17 February 1994) 6.
At the federal level, a similar political consensus seems to exist. See A. Meade, "Move to
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Arena proceeds to a description of "female genital mutilation" by
characterizing it as "horrific stuff'," 7 whereupon she reads into the record
a detailed narration of the procedures with the preface that this is "what
female genital mutilation is all about"."8 Anxious to deal with reactions
which might label her statements as insensitive to Islam, she quickly
points out that this is not an accepted practice in that religion. After all
"[t]here may be some section of the Islamic religious community which
uses the practice, but after all there are fanatics in every religion.""' 9
After insisting on Australia's duty to end the practice "as a civilised
society",12 0 Arena is joined in her own version of a crusade/jihad by
another member of the Upper House, the Reverend Fred Nile of the
evangelical Christian Call To Australia Party. Nile joins inby labeling the
practice as "abhorrent" and "barbaric"' 12' and then proceeds to efface the
Other in a call to female purity in need of protection from the Law of the
Father. "This issue affects us all. It could be your daughter, your sister,
your grandchild married to a man who demands circumcision. Would
honourable members allow it then?"'22
Finally, we return to Franca Arena who, faced with the barbarians at
the gates, musters all her tropes in one last action:
Above all, it is imperative that we protect our girls. Let us defend them,
give them protection, self esteem and freedom from barbaric practices
which have nothing to do with Australia, the Australian way of life--or,
with the precepts of civilised society anywhere in the world. 23
Inevitably and inexorably, the official discourse takes on and expands
upon the dominant images and practices of the effacement of the Other
and her reinscription as identity in the name of that which can be named,
"civilised society"-Australia, not "Australia" and against that which
cannot be named, the reality, the iterability of the inscribed Other. The
problem of "female genital mutilation" is now an Australian problem, it
is the problem, once again, of "us" and "them".
outlaw genital maiming" Sydney Morning Herald (22 February 1994)5; S. Olsen, "7 years' jail
for female 'ritual' [Sydney] Telegraph Mirror (3 March 1994) 5; "Female genital mutilation
'barbaric', is the political consensus" Canberra Times (4 March 1994) 16. The publicity
barrage continues. See e.g. J. Connell, "Increase in female mutilation confirmed" Sydney
Morning Herald (4 October 1994) 11; D. Jopson, "Call for talks on female mutilation" Sydney
Morning Herald (11 October 1994) 12; "Life for the world's girls-nasty, brutish and short"
Sydney Morning Herald (II October 1994) 12.
117. Australia Legislative Council, Hansard (10 March 1994) at 464.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid. at 465.
120. Ibid. at 475.
121. Ibid. at 476.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid. at 478.
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Our Parliamentarians are not alone, however, in the production of
discourses which circulate at/around the heartland which is the border
which must be defended at all costs. The medical profession, which
continues to practice Cesarean sections, episeotomy, cosmetic surgery,
and to oppose births with the aid of midwifes and traditional birth
attendants in Aboriginal communities, 124 has weighed into the debate, in
a formal call from the Australian Medical Association, for the federal
government to criminalize the practice in order to "respect the health,
welfare and integrity of human beings, and women particularly.11
125
At the same time, the other professional group noted for its long-
standing interest in "women's issues"-the lawyers-has also entered
the fray. The Family Law Council of Australia issued a discussion paper
on the subject at the end of January 1994. The Council made some attempt
to deal with issues of cultural sensitivity in a type of contextualized
manner but nonetheless reached the conclusion that a clear statement of
law criminalizing the practice was required. In reaching this conclusion,
the Council nonetheless found that:
There appears to have been no open inquiry into the incidence of female
genital mutilation in Australia to date and information on the incidence of
the practice in this country is unknown. The available evidence does
suggest, however, that the population who come from countries which
practise female genital mutilation is small and it is therefore likely that the
incidence of the practice in this country is also minimal. The Family Law
Council is interested in hearing from any person who has evidence,
anecdotal or otherwise, of the practice of female genital mutilation in
Australia.'26
The effect of the Council's intervention is obvious. The life of the Other
is spoken, written in her absence. She can give testimony of her existence
only if that testimony offers a confirmation of the denial of her alterity.
124. See S. Voumard, "Aborigines denied traditional birth" Sydney Morning Herald (5 April
1994) 6.
125. See "AMA call to outlaw female circumcision" Sydney Sun-Herald (6 February 1994)
12; H. Signy, "Call for tighter law on genital mutilation" Sydney Morning Herald (8 February
1994) 11.
126. Female Genital Mutilation, Discussion Paper (1994) at 14. See also, M. Liverani, "Law
Society Unequivocal on Female Genital Mutilation" (June 1994) 32 Law Society Journal (New
South Wales) 68; and M. Watt, "Family Law Notes-Female Genital Mutilation" (June 1994)
Australian Lawyer 48. The final report of the Family Law Council repeated the call for
criminalization which has been accepted in principle by the federal Attorney-General. See B.
Jones, "Lavarch to ban female mutilation" Sun-Herald (26 June 1994) 7. See also Queensland
Law Reform Commission, Female Genital Mutilation, Report No. 47 (September 1994). The
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women has adopted similar discursive positions.
See Recommendations to the Government of Canada on Female Genital Mutilation (March
1994).
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There must be an open debate, she must once again be split apart, torn
asunder, opened up to the gaze of the Law of the Father. The reaction to
this inscription was quick and virtually unanimous. The press, bolstered
by the existence of a child protection case in a Melbourne Court in which
the practice of female genital mutilation was at stake, joined in the heated
calls for criminalization.
127
Interestingly enough, it is only when the discourses of professional
disciplinization operate together with the popular media that a state of
moral panic sufficient to make the effacement of the Other through
criminalization seems to operate. Indeed, it is safe to say that all these
discourses must be seen to operate in an interconnected matrix in order
to fully understand the ways in which they fulfill their signifying
functions. A cursory examination of the sites of these discourses clearly
reveals their symbiotic relationships, as Parliamentarians cite TV shows
and newspaper articles and newspaper reporters cite Parliamentary
offerings and tawyers' inTesenions. These cites become sites for the
hegemonic construction of the Other. Without these interbreedings, the
body of the Other does not become pregnant with meaning.
In Australia, it would appear, recent years have given rise to cyclical
interventions by the print media on the subject of "female genital
mutilation" but without the current hegemonic concurrence of forces
which make criminalization a real possibility. In 1986-1987128 and again
in 1992,129 newspaper stories have brought the issue into part of the public
consciousness but without stirring professional and state interest to the
level of recent and current activity.
The debate which began in Australia at the end of 1993, and which
continues to this day, has managed to achieve a degree of hegemony to
127. See H. Signy, "Call for tighter law on genital mutilation" Sydney Morning Herald
(8 February 1994) 4; M. Easterbrook, "Get tough on female circumcision: lawyers" The
[Melbourne] Age (11 February 1994) 4; M. Gunn, "Mothers fear action over female circum-
cision" Weekend Australian (4 December 1993) 9; A. Harding, "Call for ban on female
circumcision" [Melbourne] Herald Sun (4 December 1993) 10; "Court monitors circumcised
girls" Sydney Morning Herald (3 January 1994) 2; T. Pegler, "Court hears of genital surgery"
Sydney Morning Herald (2 December 1993) 4.
128. See J. Fife-Yeomans, "Moslem Circumcision-For and Against: Mother sees no need to
cry-Against our religion, says WA leader" The West Australian (3 March 1986) 3; P. Fraser,
"Anger over accusations of barbarism" Great Southern Herald (3 May 1986) 1; J. Howard,
"The unspeakable horror of female circumcision" The Australian (2 March 1987) 10:
W. Tuohy, "AMA agrees baby girls are being circumcised" The [Melbourne] Age (20 February
1987) 6; "Circumcision of girl babies to be checked" The [Melbourne] Age (21 February
1987) 8; "Young Girls Die From Mutilation" Daily News (27 February 1987) 3; R. Dixon,
"Female circumcision is child abuse: policewoman" The [Melbourne] Age (19 February
1987) 5; "Circumcisions upset Moslem" The West Australian (4 March 1986) 36.
129. See H. Pitt, "Customs and Excise: What is Female Circumcision and How Common is
it in Australia?" The Bulletin (25 August 1992) 36.
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which previous interventions, despite the marginal involvement of poli-
ticians, doctors and the police, could never aspire. The creation of
hegemonic discourses of, about and within "Australia", or Australia, in
its neo/post-colonial guise continue unabated. A group called Women
Lawyers Against Female Genital Mutilation has been formed and is
actively involved in the criminalization campaign. 3' The popular press
reflects the political obsession with the Other and her "unlawful entry"
into "Australia". Indeed, the same rhetorical strategies are deployed with
a frightening frequency. A few recent examples will reveal the consistent
reemergence of the themes of national integrity and the effacement of the
Other.
Karen Kissane, writing in the Melbourne Age, sets the appropriately
sensitive frame of post-colonial enlightenment when she writes:
Colonialism had many evils, but it shone a few lights in dark places,
stopping some peoples from eating their enemies and others from leaving
their girl-babies out to die. But ethnic arrogance has no place in multi-
cultural worlds like today's Australia. How, then, do we deal with
minority-group traditions that the majority abhor, such as genital mutila-
tion of little girls? How far should tolerance for diversity and respect for
values of others stretch?' 3'
Kissane's response to her own query is obvious:
Genital mutilation should be criminalised if migrants are to get the clear
message about how serious a practice it is.132
The tropes set out here for mass consumption are clear as is the discursive
strategy informing such press interventions. As in the professional
discourses of the politicians, lawyers and the doctors, the press here must
act as guardians, standing at the gates of the Australian monolith to keep
a strong and serious vigil against the subversive elements of alterity. For
that is the danger of the Other. She is subversive, undermining and
underwriting, offering a text which challenges the official version. Thus,
in Kissane's particular intervention, the evils of imperialism are dis-
missed in one predicate phrase while its benefits, i.e. the elimination of
cannibalism and other clearly barbaric practices, are clearly detailed.
"Ethnic arrogance" of the Australian is at once decried and dismissed as
theoretically inappropriate and then practically and effectively employed
as the primary textual attack aimed at the effacement of the Other. She is
part of a "minority group", without claim to "Australian" status. She can
130. See D. Smith, "Painful truth about female circumcision" Sydney Morning Herald
(3 December 1993) 11.
131. "We must set limits, for the sake of little girls" The [Melbourne] Age (3 December
1993) 16.
132. Ibid.
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be accommodated by "tolerance" for "diversity" which can only "stretch"
so far. The double strategy of effacement already encountered again and
again manifests itself once more. "Tolerance" and "diversity" require a
recognition of the Other as Other-effacement. But even this erasure of the
Other can only go so far. Its elasticity is limited for we are again speaking
of limits, of borders, of the nation which cannot define itself without
exclusion and identity. The inelasticity of the tolerance is the refusal to
be open to the possibility of the impossible, of justice. It is the unbroken
hymen of the M(O)ther country, the limit of justice, 133 the point beyond
which tolerance cannot, will not, be stretched, the breaking point at which
"our" borders can not be circumscribed, torn asunder. As Kissane tells us,
we are in fact dealing with "migrants", strangers, intruders, subversives
against whom the headline and the text trumpets, "We must set limits".
Indeed, it is only by setting limits that the Other can be stopped and
"justice" can be served, our laws and values must be accepted, we must
dare to condemn' all that is foreign to our moral and ethical values.
When these "barbaric" practices are being performed "here", the subver-
sion of Australia, the text which must exist without a hint, without a trace
of/or subversion, must be protected. 135 For "we" know now, if ever there
was any doubt that "[i]t is one custom which has no place here. The chief
objective of any government should be to end female genital mutilation
in Australia as quickly as possible.' 3 6 After all, these people come "from
the various trouble spots of Africa" ' and we cannot allow theirproblems
to become our problems. The press in Australia has been consistent in its
coverage of "female genital mutilation". It has certified all of the truths
necessary to efface and erase the Other: the benefits of colonialism, the
barbarism of the Other, the dangers inherent in this barbaric subversion
of the text which is Australia. Nowhere is the consistent replication of the
metropolitan colonization of the text of alterity more evident than in one
very particular example of writing the body of the Other.
"What attracts a man even more than sex"; "Valentine Bonus-Erotic
Fiction"; "25 Bad Beauty Habits and ways to break them"; "8 sensational
ways to wear a white shirt"; the February 1994 edition of Australian
Cosmopolitan contains promises of each of these stories on its front cover
and details on the inside. Unremarkable by traditional standards of
133. See Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, supra note 3.
134. See K. Donnelly, "Daring to condemn" Herald Sun (8 December 1993) 16.
135. See M. Groves, "Worst kind of child abuse" Sunday Herald Sun (12 December
1993) 112.
136. See Editorial, "A test for multiculturalism" Sydney Morning Herald (24 February
1994) 14.
137. Ibid.
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Cosmo. What is remarkable about the February 1994 edition of Cosmo-
politan magazine is that it contains one more story---"Sealed Section Our
shocking report on female circumcision". Inside, eight pages of text and
color photographs on "female genital mutilation", including an excerpt
from Alice Walker's Warrior Marks.38 What is important to note here is
not yet another example of the production/reproduction and circulation
of the same sets of metropolitan meanings in one more forum of the
popular media but rather the forum in particular and the other messages
which combine with and circulate in and around this particular pro-
duction of "female genital mutilation" as a moment of discursive inter-
vention in the metropole.
Here, the "mutilated" body of the black Other is situated in relation to
an entire set of images of acceptable female beauty and form. What
creates the starkness of alterity in the discourse on "female genital
mutilation" here is its unquestioned relationship with the completely
uninterrogated images and texts of Cosmopolitan which construct the
Other of the Other, the natural beauty next to the preternatural beauty. The
white-skinned, blue-eyed natural Australian beauty next to the mutilated
barbaric form of the African Other. Again it is not simply the fact and
facticity of the juxtaposed images and texts but the equally powerful
textual fact that the texts are not questioned or even questionable. Their
existence is legally binding evidence of the existence and concomitant
effacement of the Other, here reduced in stark and contrasting terms to the
object of the unquestioning gaze, reduced to the status of object to be
examined, classified, understood and ultimately effaced not just in its
alterity but in its comparison to the ur-text of beauty.
But the violence of the word and of the gaze does not stop here. In the
Cosmopolitan, metropolitan text here, the reading strategy required, the
only hermeneutic deployment available, is reinforced by the physicality
of the text itself. Cosmopolitan leaves the reader with no choice, s/he must
not only reduce the Other to the gaze, s/he must reduce her to a virtual/
literal act of physical submission and of violation. The text and photo-
graphs are hidden from the gaze, locked away in a sealed section,
pornographically isolated. The text, the body of the Other can be seen,
interpreted, studied, subjected to the gaze, only through an act of literal
and figurative violence. The binding, the boundary, the ligature of the
body of the Other must be literally cut, torn, ripped. Access here is
restricted, the border between us and the Other, a physical barrier. The
strategy of reading the Other here can only ever be a strategy of violence,
ripping, tearing asunder the text.
138. See Walker & Parmar, supra note 18; See also (February 1994) Cosmopolitan 99-106.
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The violence of the Western text of alterity in relation to "female
genital mutilation" finds its ultimate and logical conclusion/embodiment
in this issue of Australian Cosmopolitan. Yet the irony here seems to
escape even the text itself, it effaces even its own hermeneutic limits. For
here the text which condemns without hesitation, equivocation or room
for doubt, in fact subjects the Other in her textual embodiment to the very
process condemned by metropolitan critics of "female genital mutila-
tion". Here, the Other has quite literally been bound up, sewn, stitched,
closed off, her sexuality, her body placed off limits, no access permitted.
She can be seen, freed from this bondage only through the equally violent
ripping, tearing, cutting, sundering of the text, of her body. The mutilation
of the Other is completed only here, in the text of the final and literal
"mutilation" of the body of the Other, in the text of Australia.
V. Beyond the Boundary
Yet it is perhaps here, in/on the text of the nation, in this case Australia,
that we can somehow begin to sense, to be sensitive to, to be sensible
about, our responsibilities to the Other, to justice. Here on the borderline
where the Other is circumscribed, excluded and effaced, it is possible to
begin to observe the trace of (an)other text, of justice.
For the text, "Australia" must itself contain the element of its own
identity crisis, of its own deconstruction. As I have already pointed out,
the neo/post-colonial super-texts which inform most, if not all debates in
"Australia" on the subject of "female genital mutilation" are informed in
a fundamental way by the deployment of the Self and the Other repre-
sented by these two elements "Australia" and "female ge-ital mutila-
tion". What would happen, then, to the claims of an underlying stability
which must be presumed to inhere in the texts for them to offer the
meaning they are deemed to carry, if the ligature that paradoxically binds
the opposition, were found to be undercut, severed, circumscribed by a
trace which lives on the borderline at the heart of "Australia"? In other
words, what becomes of "Australia" and of "female genital mutilation"
when "Australia" is circumcised, circum-inscribed?
It is clear, to begin at the beginning of such a reading of the text-
"Australia"-we must begin to interrogate the beginning, the origins of
"Australia", the original and the originary. Better yet, let us begin before
the beginning, before the original, with the forgotten who can neither be
forgotten, nor remembered: the Aboriginal. This is the beginning of
injustice-the immemorial beginning, the pre-text of justice and of the
forgetting which is injustice-the injustice of the "Aboriginal". The
original, the before and the after, the temporality of a passing, a linguistic
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and a military conquest and hegemony which effaces the Other by naming
her/him. In brief, the "Aboriginal", the named Other of/at the European
invasion/conquest. The naming which evades responsibility. Erased in
her/his naming, incorporated by the injustice of legality from terra
nullius to Mabo,139 a limited justice, the very nature of injustice. The
naming, the "Aboriginal", a limited incorporation, the violence of the
word, the word law-Australia-blasphemy---"Australia"-the crime
of injustice, of writing, for which we must seek pardon, the gift of
forgiveness.
This then is the exact point of incision, of inscribing the circumstances
of "Australia", of circumcising "Australia". Of asking who can speak of
"Australia", when in fact they seek to speak of Australia, unlimited,
universal. If we are to offer a deconstructive reading of "female genital
mutilation", let us begin and end, for the moment, warily, moment-
warily, under the proscriptive inscription of the trace marking Australia
"Australia".
I do not wish to offer here either a detailed reading of an "authentic"
Aboriginality or of the ethnographic texts which have constructed com-
peting visions. The former would be an injustice and the latter is
unnecessary. Suffice to say that ethnographic constructions of issues of
relevance here, especially of "gender", are complex, mutable texts, the
politics of which themselves largely await a deconstructive gesture.14 At
the same time, the deconstructive search for the call to/of justice can never
find, or even search for, an authenticity beyond the same deconstructive
gesture, for that too would constitute injustice. At the same time, again,
before and after, it is important to note that the "Aboriginal" body, male
and female, in many parts of "Australia" has always been the site for the
literal graphic inscription of the law of belonging. Depilation, cicatrization,
and fire ceremonies operate in different areas to mark the body. 141 The
texts are many, "our" openness to hearing/reading them is the question of
justice which informs this entire work.
139. See Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1. In this case the High Court of Australia
abandoned the doctrine of terra nullius and recognized a limited right to "native title". The
incorporation of the Other into the system of Law was accomplished through this process of
"recognition" and the effacement of alterity which is the essence of such legal strategies. See
D. Fraser, "This Land Is (My) Land, This Land Is (Your) Land: Mabo, Deconstruction and
(In)Justice" (1993) [unpublished] for a tentative exploration of these issues.
140. For a careful study of the construction of discourses in relation to the issue of gender in
recent years, see F. Merlan, "Gender in Aboriginal social life: A review" in R. Berndt &
R. Tonkinson, eds., Social Anthropology and Australian Aboriginal Studies (Canberra:
Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988) at 17.
141. For a brief description and introduction to the context and importance of these practices,
see R. Bemdt & C. Berndt, The World of the First Australians (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies
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It is simply necessary and sufficient here to undermine and circum-
scribe the text Australia with the other text "Australia", the text of the
Other. Indeed, in the very text Australia, "female genital mutilation" is
itself inscribed and written under erasure in the text of the colonizing text
of ethnography, and of the ethnographer who inscribes and circumscribes
his text with a border to interdict the Other and any intercourse between
the Other and Australia which is not itself strictly regulated and written
in the body/border of the text and the text of the body.
The classic and sufficient example in this case of the customs and
excise control over the customs of ex/in/cision is the text Ethnological
Studies Among The North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines by
Walter E. Roth of Magdalen College, Oxford, published in 1897 by the
Queensland Government Printer. The text itself then, the body of work,
before it has begun, is described and inscribed with the imprimatur of
authority, from the center of Empire and its institutional embodiment,
Oxford, to the work's status as a text of the government of the State of
Queensland on/about "its" "Aborigines". The corporeal weight and
function is undoubted, official. This is an authentic text.
But the stamping of the guardtower function on the title page is not a
sufficient limiting function. More border controls are subsequently
necessary. The limits of Australia must be clearly written here in the body
of the text of the law of ethnography, the writing of the people, the
"Aborigines", who, although they precede and exceed history and eth-
nography, must nonetheless succumb to the disciplinary corporeal incor-
poration at/in the discursive border. Thus, the last chapter, chapter XIII,
must be reinscribed, the limits drawn and reinforced. The author's note
notes authoritatively, graphically inscribing the limits of the text, "The
following chapter is not suitable for perusal by the general lay reader. '14
The Other is to be excluded even from the excluding view of the
general lay reader. The inscription found in the Chapter title indicates the
reason-the title--"Ethno-Pornography". The evil influence, the public
health danger, the high risk that the body politic might become infected
Press, 1988) at 166-87. For more detailed studies of particular areas, see H. Basedow,
"Anthropological notes on the Western Coastal Tribes of the Northern Territory of South
Australia" (1907) 31 Transactions of the Royal Society of South Australia 1; G. Roheim,
"Women and Their Life in Central Australia" (1933) 53 Journal of the Royal Anthropological
Institute 207; B. Spencer & F. Gillen, The Native Tribes of Central Australia (London:
Macmillan and Co. 1938); A. Lommel, "Notes on Sexual Behaviour and Initiation, Wunambel
Tribe, North-Western Australia" (1949) 22 Oceania 158. While each of these works suffers
from the disease of a traditional and Metropolitan disciplinarity, each also attempts to
demonstrate the context and interrelations of the practices.
142. W. Roth, Ethnological Studies Among The North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines
(Brisbane: Government Printer, 1897) at 169.
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with/by the description of the sexual practices of the Other at the heart of
Australia-"Australia"-is too much for the authorities and the author to
risk. The porno-graphy, the writing of "harlots", must be kept to the
professionals who possess the appropriate discipline.
143
What is it then that Australia (and by logical extension, the metropole
more broadly understood) might learn? What is the infectious disease
against which the immunological barriers must be raised? It is the danger
of "female genital mutilation" as an original and originating of "Austra-
lia". Here is Roth's description, with all its racist and colonial attributes
left intact, of the ceremonial initiation among the Pitta-Pitta:
Two or three men manage to get the young woman, when thus ripe enough,
all alone by herself away in the bush, and, throwing her down, one of them
forcibly enlarges the vaginal orifice by tearing it downwards with the first
three fingers wound round and round with opossum-string.... Other men
come forwards from all directions, and the struggling victim has to submit
in rotation to promiscuous coition with all the "bucks" present.... She has
now attained the degree in which she is allowed to marry, and can
henceforth wear the grass necklace, the human-hair belt, the opossum-
string necklet, belt, &c.11
It is not difficult to note the problematic nature of Roth's "description".
The "victim" must engage in "promiscuous" intercourse with the "bucks".
It is little wonder that the general public must be barred from learning of
this "animalistic" practice. This is for Roth beyond barbarism, it is a
descent down the tree of evolution to a lower stage of development. But
the process of subversion of the text of Australia need not be concerned
here with these obvious difficulties in characterizing Roth's text as
anything other than another text itself infected by the virus of colonial
superiority. For a careful reading of Roth's study reveals more interesting
facts, which can, for the purposes of interrogating the colonial text of
Australia in general, be separated from the inherent biases of the imperial
ethnographer.
For example, as Roth himself recognizes, the practice of the "female
genital mutilation" in question occurs within the broader context both of
the maturity/identity process of belonging and is only one of several
stages in the process as a whole. 14 5 Moreover, males undergo similar
initiation rites including in many cases introcision. 146 Again, this simply
reinforces a contention that the process of characterizing events as
143. See M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage,
1979).
144. Supra note 142 at 174.
145. Ibid. at 175.
146. Ibid. at 177.
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"female genital mutilation" seriously risks imposing a reading on the text
of the social practices in question which promotes and perpetuates the
colonial, metropolitan practices which are what really inform the reading
rather than any objective, universal truth about humanity, human rights
or gender.
To return to an idea introduced earlier as a possible deconstructive
point of incision in discussing these issues, one last point made in Roth's
problematic but emblematic text must be entered into the text here. The
issue of male circumcision, or in this case of the more radical introcision,
must again be interrogated as to its point of contact with the text of the
exotic, erotic Other embodied and embedded in the metropolitan text of
"female genital mutilation". Thus Roth himself notes'47 an hypothesis
according to which, that while "female mutilation" occurred first and was
probably meant to allow simpler accessibility for men, the female
"mutilation" underwent a social, hermeneutic transformation whereby it
began to symbolize the woman's suitability, experience and availability
for copulation. Thereafter, the practice of male introcision could be
explained as a form of mimicry by which men subsequently graphically
exposed themselves as fulfilling the same criteria. While Roth's textual
reading is informed by a phallogocentric cultural world view, it nonethe-
less opens up other possible readings which would require us simply to
place the practices relating to the female and male bodies as contempo-
raneous or to reverse the gendered presumptions of the Roth view and
place the practice relating to women first in a context other than "patri-
archy". In other words, the text of the female body is the ur-text, the
openness, the absence of the penis which is primary in Western, Freudian
and post-Freudian readings of the textual female body (and to many
readings of the concept of "mutilation") is itself made absent as the
female open-text is the foundational writing. In this case, the mimicry
associated by Roth with the practice takes on a different meaning. Then,
his etymological assertion that among the Pitta-Pitta and associated
groups, the term used to describe an introcised penis, me-ko ma-ro, means
the one with a slit or vulva, in such a deconstructive opening, literally and
figuratively becomes an opening to the Other. The pre-text here can be
radically re-inscribed, ex-cised, opened up to another possibility which
places "female genital mutilation" in a con-text which requires a
deconstructive willingness to re-open the inquiry into "injustice".
Then, the text of "Australia" can come to serve as the trace of
Australia, offering graphic proof, written in the body politic of the
"Aboriginal" nation that the practice of "female genital mutilation" is not,
147. Ibid. at 180.
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in fact, written outside the nation, imported to destroy the society by acts
of wanton barbarism. If it does in reality threaten the text-Australia-
it does so from within and without, as the trace which destroys and creates
the text. It, "female genital mutilation", is the ab-original which itself
borders and encircles as it escapes the original text-Australia-impos-
sible, not yet the impossible. The aporia of/as the boundary. The bound-
less text.
VI. Responsibility and Criminality-
Hearing the Silent Call to Justice
The question which is now asked is the question of justice. How do we
respond to the various discourses circulating in and around the issue of
"female genital mutilation" here in the metropolitan center and "out
there" in the "Third World" without becoming instantly complicitous in
the imperialist, neo/post-colonialist construction and effacement of the
Other? In other words, how can we who work and function in the
academic world of the West avoid our own complicity in the production
of the same elite discourses which have created and imprisoned the Other
and created at the same time the disciplinary and exclusionary tropes
which circulate in and through popular culture in the denial of alterity
through recognition and exclusion?
How do we resist the turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses,
when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and
disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics.., from
turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the
academic sense?
48
The question of the deconstructive intervention in the debates around
"female genital mutilation" then becomes the questioning of the
deconstructive intervention into these debates and of the borders/bound-
aries/delimitations/demarcations of the incisive entries. Where is the
point of incision which would allow for a circumscription of the text
written in/on the body of the Other which will allow the trace of the call
to justice to be heard? Where can we begin to respond to the call to justice?
Where does our responsibility begin? It begins, in fact, in the fact of the
writing of the body of the Other and in the rewriting of the body of the
Other in the body of the Law. In other words, it begins in the injustice of
the inscription and in the solidarities we sense as constituting "our"
responsibilities to that text. At the same time, given the gift of the
deconstructive gesture ofjustice, it also always begins with an interrogation
148. Chow, supra note 77 at 17.
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of the responsibilities themselves and of the ways in which the responses
are dictated not by the texts themselves but by other inscriptions of/on the
body of the law.
Our goal must be, "to set up a discourse that cuts across some of our
new 'solidarities' by juxtaposing a range of cultural contradictions that
make us rethink the currently dominant conceptualizations of the soli-
darities themselves."'49 Thus the strategic and tactical interventions in
response to our responsibilities must always themselves interrogate not
only the text into which we intervene, "female genital mutilation", but
also the points of intervention themselves. Here, the primary point of
intervention which must first come under scrutiny is the call to
criminalization which informs the debate about "female genital mutila-
tion" in the metropolitan center.
At its most obvious, the move to criminalization is a text underpinned
by its inherent and then specifically articulated appeal to the principle of
justice. The practice of "female genital mutilation" must be criminalized
because justice and equality demand it. The barbaric has no place in the
cultural and political center of the Law. But this call to criminalization is
not beyond carrying the trace of its own undermining. The call to
criminalization is a response not to a sense of responsibility to the call of
the Other, to the memory which must not be forgotten, but rather it is a
response to the forgetting of the Other. It is the originary and original
violence of the Law and of the word. 150 It is a violent inscription of the
body of the Other in the text of exclusion and discipline. It is the
sovereignty over the body which again reinscribes the body of the Other,
which marks her with the graphic stigmata of exclusion. The Law writes
her as outside the text. It is a violent exclusion.
A brief examination of the English experience with the criminalization
of "female genital mutilation" clearly demonstrates that despite the best
intentions of many involved, the strategy of criminalization almost
inevitably leads to the further entrenchment of the very injustices the
mechanism is meant to combat.
The British decision to criminalize "female genital mutilation"'
5 1
came about as the result of the combination of many of the phenomena
which are currently circulating in Australia and elsewhere. Thus, we can
find the historical legacy of British colonialism in the presence of
diasporic communities in England, exacerbated by the occasional influx
149. Ibid. at 25.
150. See Derrida, "Force of Law", supra note 4; and R. Cover, "Violence and the Word"
(1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1601.
151. See Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985, Ch. 38.
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of further "refugees" as the result of civil war, unrest, and economic and
cultural devastation directly or indirectly caused by colonialism, neo/
post-colonialist interventions and the creation of the "Third World" as an
economic buttress to international capital. As a consequence of the
disruptive arrival and presence of these diasporic communities, "female
genital mutilation" became a phenomenon occurring in the metropole
and a concern for metropolitan feminists as evidence of the colonial
heritage in "Africa" came to their attention.
In these circumstances, "female genital mutilation" became a text
treated in the professional discourses of the metropolitan center as
doctors 52 and lawyers 5 3 began to define and limit the phenomenon to the
boundaries imposed by their professional discourses. At the same time,
the media began a campaign to bring the issue to the attention of the
"English" public. Finally, as a result of this complex matrix of discourses
circulating in the interpretive swirl surrounding "female genital mutila-
tion" steps were taken to begin the process of criminalizing the proce-
dures. 54 As events seem to amply demonstrate, the criminalization
process cannot be understood, nor would it have "succeeded", without a
whole set of metropolitan assumptions about the female Other and the
danger which is posed, not to her body where the most graphic and
primary inscription occurs, but to the body politic if such textual practices
as "female genital mutilation" are allowed to continue.
Indeed, it appears obvious from the reality of the various attempts to
criminalize "female genital mutilation", that the primary goal and effect
of such a strategy can not help but be one of exclusion and virtual
eradication of the female Other from the body politic, both literally and
figuratively. Within the context of metropolitan discourses about and
around "female genital mutilation", for example, the construction of the
nation, the boundary of which cannot be transversed or transcribed by the
procedures in question, poses obstacles to the very goal of the
criminalization process itself. Thus, the boundary is transversed, tra-
versed, reinscribed in what might be described as the deconstructive
process of "double invagination", the folding of the phallogocentric
discourse of neo/post-colonial imperialism back upon itself.'55 One of the
152. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
153. See K. Hayter, "Female Circumcision-Is There a Legal Solution?" (1984) J. of Soc.
Welfare L. 323; T. Ogiamien, "A Legal Framework to Eradicate Female Circumcision" (1988)
28 Med. Sci.L. 115.
154. See E. Sochart, "Agenda Setting, the Role of Groups and the Legislative Process: The
Prohibition of Female Circumcision in Britain" (1988) 41 Parliamentary Affairs 508.
155. See J. Derrida, "Living On: Border Lines" in H. Bloom, ed., Deconstruction and
Criticism (New York: Seabury Press, 1979) at97; and "The Law of Genre" (1983) 7 Glyph 202.
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developments of imperialist progress and technological advancement
which both created the possibility of the imperialist enterprise and which
makes its continuation possible, is the ready accessibility of relatively
cheap and quick intercontinental travel. In our time and space, both time
and space are contracted, making the geography of imperialism a simpler
phenomenon.
In the context of "female genital mutilation", this has two immediate
and obvious consequences. First, it makes the Diaspora possible. The
"refugee" can find herself transported from her "native" land to the
metropole in a matter of hours. This means that the problem of "female
genital mutilation" becomes a metropolitan problem in the real sense of
the physical presence of the female Other within the national borders. The
physical and technological progress of the imperialist center brings the
issues of imperialism to the heart of the national text as never before. One
hermeneutic result of this diasporic reality is not just the presence of the
alien text written on the body of the female Other, but also the inevitable
deployment of textual practices, such as the racist discourses which often
accompany the presence of the Other at the center, as well as the
circulation of all the discourses of effacement and exclusion which
culminate in the process of criminalization. Faced with the weight of the
constant barrage of the discourses of alterity which define her presence
under the threat of absence in the Metropole, it becomes understandable
if that alterity manifests itself both by a defiant rejection of the homog-
enizing impetus of the metropolitan culture and by a return to the
"culture" from which she came in order not only to stave off the erasure
of the racist but also to redefine herself in the face of the constant
disruption of Diaspora, of the rupture of links with innumerable textual
practices which have given context to the text of her life. At these stages,
"female genital mutilation" might come to be seen as the text of the
imperial center written defiantly on the body of the female Other. Thus,
the struggle over and around "culture" which results in the colonial
freezing of "culture" as folklore and ethnography and appeals to a
nostalgic, non-existent and revisionist "past" from anti-colonialist "na-
tionalists", reasserts itself as the Diaspora becomes a different site of
struggle.
At the same time as "progress" makes the presence of the subversion
inevitable, the technology and geography of modem imperialism, make
possible the escape of the text of alterity from the defining and effacing
grapheme of the metropole. The exclusion of the practice of "female
genital mutilation" through the violence of criminalization may simply
result in the decision to return "home" so that the procedure can be
performed. Thus, the body of the Other, with its inscription of alterity
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escapes the borders and boundaries of the genre-nation-and returns to
the native text, only to return to the metropolitan center to reinscribe by
her presence the failures of all customs and excisory controls on the body
of the female Other. The text of the metropole is turned on itself as the
body of the female escapes all attempts to bind it to the boundaries of
passport control.
The only possible reaction by the metropolitan state faced with the
effacement of its binding boundaries and its attempts to control and efface
the graphic inscription of alterity then appears to be a reinscription of the
texts of criminalization and imperialism. In other words, these textual
strategies are redeployed, the first by criminalizing attempts to escape
from the binding boundaries of the text-nation-to carry out the
inscription of "female genital mutilation", and secondly, to engage in
"international pressure" to ensure the abandonment of the practice in the
"native country". But as this latter practice enters the domain of national
identity in the neo/post-colonial era, it will inevitably involve a complex
set of discourses and deployments which may well serve to undermine the
strategy by highlighting its imperial and imperialist roots since it has
been, until now, apparently dominated by the dominant texts of those
universalizing Eurocentric tropes which only a few years ago served as
the philosophical justification of colonial exploitation.
At the same time, this move from the metropolitan center to interna-
tionalize the process of criminalization in relation to "female genital
mutilation" has also served in part to encourage Diaspora and thereby to
undermine the textual and territorial integrity of the metropolitan center
itself. Thus, "Third World" women and their supporters are now begin-
ning to claim refugee status in order to gain entry to the West as a result
of their fears of "female genital mutilation".1 6
Once again and simultaneously, it is necessary to interrogate more
fully than I can here, the phenomenon of criminalization in this context.
In many cases, the circumciser is a female relative or a senior woman in
156. See V. Oosterveld, "Refugee Status for Female Circumcision Fugitives: Building a
Canadian Precedent" (1993) 51 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 277; T. Egan, "An Ancient Ritual and a
Mother's Asylum Plea" New York Times (4 March 1994) B 16; Z. Kazure, Letter to the Editor,
"Forced Circumcision is Alien to Nigeria" New York Times (9 March 1994) A 14. The Canadian
state has now taken this step and granted refugee status to a Somali woman seeking to protect
her 10 year old daughter from "female genital mutilation". See K.H. Farah et.al., Immigration
and Refugee Board (Refugee Division) (10 May 1994) Decision T93-12198. See also, L.
Monsebraaten, "Mother given refugee status to save daughter from sexual mutilation" Toronto
Star (14 July 1994) Al. T. Fennell, "Finding new grounds for refuge" Maclean's (8 August
1994) 20. At the same time, 'international' legal and political discourse attempts to deal with
the 'problem' in traditional ways. See B. Crossette, "In Cairo, Pleas to Stop Maiming Girls"
New York Times (11 September 1994) A4.
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the community, a so-called "granny". Even assuming that the
criminalization works in the positivist sense, i.e., that the "granny" and
the family members who are her accessories or co-conspirators are
apprehended, tried and convicted, it then becomes important, if not vital,
to ask, what is likely to have been achieved in such circumstances. It is
unlikely that the procedure occurred in circumstances of ignorance of the
law and even if it did, it is further unlikely that submission to the
metropolitan criminal justice system will have the effect of convincing
the "perpetrators" of the error of their ways.
There seems to be some recognition of this reality in France, where
"female genital mutilation" is criminalized by the application of Article
312 of the Penal Code which deals with violence against children. While
there is some evidence that the penalties imposed had been increasing
(10-20 years, life imprisonment in the case of parents), a recent incident
involving a couple from Mali resulted in a four-year suspended sentence.'57
If the practice is carried out because it is a deeply ingrained and
accepted cultural practice with implications for personal, family, group
and gender identity, it is not particularly plausible to maintain that the
process of criminalization will have an educative or deterrent effect. Nor
can it be realistically suggested that newer theories of "reintegrative
shaming" will be apposite.'58 This is true not simply because the formal
criminal justice system is ill-equipped to deal with the intricacies required
for such "shaming" to work but more fundamentally, in all likelihood, the
participants in the crime are already integrated into the group, the
violation of whose ethical and moral norms would in fact instill shame in
them. Indeed, it was in compliance with these very norms that the
procedure would have been carried out. In cases such as "female genital
mutilation", the differend at issue is real. "Reintegrative shaming" in
circumstances such as this can be founded only in an homogenized ideal
of the community into which reintegration is deemed necessary by the
state. This is the assumption behind criminalization itself. It is the
assumption of colonialism and imperialism.159
157. "Girls mutilated" Sun Herald (15 May 1994) 10. These French decisions are not greeted
with unanimous support however. See A. Gumbel, "Outrage at circumcision case result"
Guardian Weekly (25 September 1994) 3.
158. See J. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1989).
159. See P. De Graaf, "The Poverty of Punishment" (1993) 5 Current Issues in Criminal
Justice 13 at 25. Ethnocentricity is fundamental to republican criniinology as the site of its
application, the stipulated "ideal" Western style democracy where the general theory of
shaming has evolved, and vhere reintegrative shaming in an "ideal city state" can take place,
is culturally homogeneous.
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If the process of criminalization will not succeed in achieving any real
result beyond the further criminalization of mostly female members of
"immigrant" communities, what is its function? The answer here seems
clear. The primary purpose served by the criminalization of "female
genital mutilation" in the centers of the metropolitan West is to emphasize
the alterity of the "Third World" women. She must be seen to engage in
practices which are barbaric and which have no place in "our" country.
Her body is to be written in terms familiar to women even in the history
of the colonial center. She is to be criminalized in her exoticism and her
eroticism. The monopoly of the phallogocentric Law of the Father is to
be maintained over the body of the Other who is woman. She is effaced
as an object of legal intervention as she is effaced as not identical,
identifiable. She is even less than Other-she is mutilated, her body is more
impure than her Western sister. Her lack, the absence of the power of the
Father, is graphically written and emphasized. She lacks even the lack.
Her absence is virtually complete.
This interpretation seems to be borne out in the experience of diasporic
communities in Britain since the passage of criminalizing legislation
there. Although there has not been a single prosecution under the statute,
this does not mean that the effects of criminalization as a Western
discursive practice are not being inscribed on the bodies of the Other.
Somali women in Britain, for example, are subjected to high levels of
surveillance and interference by social workers who are trying to uncover
the "truth" about "female genital mutilation". Newspaper and television
stories on the subject result in increased levels of harassment and
ostracism. Likewise, in Australia, the recent outbursts surrounding "fe-
male genital mutilation" and in particular the debate sparked by the
Family Law Council's Discussion Paper, have been experienced by
women in diasporic communities as yet more examples of exclusion,
silencing and of racial violence against them as members of a highly
visible minority.'I° In short, while criminalization has not resulted in the
formal prosecution of the Other, it has created the background and
legitimation function against which the Other can be surveilled, harassed
and otherwise disciplined. The exclusion of the Other from the body
politic, which is the essential immunizing function of criminalization, is
perfected through the interstices of all other forms of metropolitan
knowledge which here effectively circumscribe the body of the Other.t 61
Despite this, however, "Australia" travels inexorably towards
160. See N. Marshall, "Response to Family Law Council, Discussion Paper on Female
Genital Mutilation/Circumcision" (March 1994) Ecumenical Migration Center.
161. See J. Flint, "Putting rites to wrong" Guardian Weekly (22 May 1994) 14.
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criminalization 162 of the exotic Other, failing to hear cries for justice and
substituting the deaf/blind act of Law.
Yet she speaks to us. The call to respond, in a responsible manner, to
reply with and in justice, does in fact present itself in the metropolitan
debates on the issue of "female genital mutilation". Authors such as
Toubia, 63 and organizations such as FORWARD, GAMS and CAMS164
in England and France speak out as women directly affected by the
practices, as "Third World" women. In Australia, against the orchestrated
cacophony of the forces who cry out for the immediate effacement of the
Other in the processes of criminalization, some dare to speak against the
mainstream, against Australia and for "Australia", for a process of
inclusion, of education and for internationalization of the Metropolitan
discursive intervention in the debates over "female genital mutilation". 1
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The goal here set by the women is to educate their communities away
from the practices in question and to attempt to provide interventions
which would also address some of the questioans of the po itical ecooamy
of the "Third World" which render some women into a state of economic
dependency on the continuation of the practice. Yet these women labour
under great difficulties. They are a minority within a minority in the
metropolitan center. Cut off in some cases from the support of family and
friends, their experience of Diaspora is made worse by their double
Otherness. At the same time they run the real risk either of being captured
by the feminist mainstream opposition to "female genital mutilation" in
the West and silenced into the status of identity and the colonization
which is inherent therein, or else they are daily confirmed in their alterity
by the ways in which they are represented in the political and media
constructions notjust of "female genital mutilation" but of their role in the
issue.
Thus, women from the Hom of Africa who engage in the difficult
battle to educate their communities in Australia are not truly consulted by
162. See "Female Genital Mutilation" (September 1994) Queensland Law Reform Commis-
sion, Working Paper; and the Crimes (Female Genital Mutilation Amendment) Bill, N.S.W.
1994, the new s. 45 of the Crimes Act, creates a "new" offense punishable by seven years in
prison. This bill was proclaimed in force in May 1995.
163. See supra note 11.
164. See Walker, Warrior Marks, supra note 18.
165. See "Project explains the harm of circumcision" Canberra Times (3 December 1993) 16;
R. West, "Agency calls on media to back off on circumcision" The [Melbourne] Age
(3 December 1993) 8; R. West, "Education better than bans, say African women" The
[Melbourne] Age (17 February 1994) 6; S. Armstrong, "Female circumcision: fighting a cruel
tradition" (2 February 1991) New Scientist 42; Z.M. Jama & A. Nielson, "Female circumci-
sion: chink of light at the end of the tunnel" (May 1991) New African 31; A. Whyte, "Female
Circumcision Exposed in Britain" (February 1991) 63 Geographical Magazine 16.
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the Family Law Council or the AMA before these two powerful groups
recommend, with the surrounding media uproar, the criminalization of
the women involved in these practices. 66 But this confirmation of their
status is confirmed by the way in which the effacement is itself written,
reported. The story comes from Rosemary West "ethnic affairs reporter".
They are, as they must be "African" women. Here again the exotic Other
is reduced to the status of object for the disciplining discourses of the
metropolitan knowledge. Their "news" is not news of a "political" or
"international" or even "local" nature. It is "ethnic" news with all of the
exclusions and effacements carried in and through that classification. In
the taxonomy of the media, these women clearly belong to a foreign and
exotic genus.
Yet another barrier to hearing and responding to these calls for justice
now reenters the scene. Here we must come face to face with the
boundaries of the other taxonomies created by our positioning in the West
and our relations within the current structures of Diaspora. To return to
Rey Chow's formulation, the deconstructive motive towards justice must
also impel us and compel us to a rethinking of the dominant
conceptualizations and solidarities within Diaspora and imperialism
themselves.167 First, we must resituate the women who struggle to end the
practices of "female genital mutilation" in the West within the Diaspora.
Such a siting further complicates the issue since it may serve to under-
mine the identification and solidarity associated with affiliation. The
material and the ideological conditions 68 of these women in Diaspora in
the West are manifestly different in a myriad of ways from conditions in
the "Third World" nation from which they came. As I have suggested
earlier, this does not mean that the Diaspora and the homeland live in
complete isolation. It does suggest however that any claim to a "natural"
or "inevitable" solidarity in its weakest form or a similarly characterized
identity in its strongest form must be fully and explicitly interrogated just
as we must always interrogate the relationship between Diaspora and the
imperial center and the function of tropes of "gender", "culture", "reli-
gion" etc. in the interstices of Diaspora/imperial center/homeland.
Moreover, we must also carefully interrogate and reinscribe our
understandings of the "Third World" itself. If the identity or solidarity of
the Other in Diaspora with the Other in the "Third World" is to be
166. See "Education better than bans, say African women" ibid.
167. Chow, supra note 77.
168. I do not mean to suggest here that ideology does not possess a materiality but rather that
the two sites operate in different ways. See L. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) at 97.
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questioned, then the idea of a "Third World" as universally identical in
its alterity must also be interrogated and disputed as it asserts its central
signifying role in much of what passes as "internationalizing" the focus
of Western feminism. As Vasuki Nesiah argues we "must explore the
centrality, and simultaneously the deconstruction and fragmentation, of
various identities, beginning with the logic that produces the category
'women'."' 69 This would and will mean not only a careful study of our
implication in the various knowledge production centers from which
many of these identities and from which the category "women" still
emanate, but equally a very close set of examinations of the real
ideological and material conditions of the Other in her many concrete
circumstances which are found in a heterogeneous "Third World" as well
as a careful interrogation of the different material and ideological
conditions of women in heterogeneous Diaspora. Then, appeals in
education campaigns by women, both in the "Third World" and in
Diaspora, to international human rights or feminist discourses can them-
selves be opened up to a deconstructive examination as we continue to
attempt to breach the aporia and respond in ajust way to the calls to newer
and newer solidarities. This will enable us to simply begin to attempt to
engage in different forms of the politics of alterity/justice.
When we can begin to interrogate the problems and dynamics of the
interaction of gender identity and nationalism in the "Arab world" for
example, 70 we might be able to construct deconstructive incisions into
the practice of "female genital mutilation". When we begin to derogate
from the arrogant perception of a monolithic "Third World", we might be
able to examine the debates which occur in the metropolitan center but
which also circulate in the various parts of the "Third World". Then can
we begin to see the implications of the fact that many women in those
countries have no access to the means of mass communication/education
which we take for granted even when we propose "education" as an
alternative to criminalization.
In fact, what has to be interrogated here is not "female genital
mutilation" but the entire matrix of the "Third World" and the quotidian
involvement we all have in the continuation of the material oppression
and construction of even more subtle and pernicious forms of oppression,
domination and submission. When we learn that Somali women in
169. Supra note 6 at 210.
170. See N. Hijab, Womanpower: the Arab Debate on Women at Work (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988); J. Tucker, ed., Arab Women. Old Boundaries, New
Frontiers (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993); L. Ahmed, Women and Gender in
Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
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refugee camps guarded by US Marines and the United Nations, fleeing
civil war and starvation still ensure that their daughters are infibulated,
can we make a claim to be engaged in the process of remembering the
Other, of seeking justice when we speak in terms of moral indignation
against the "barbaric" practice of "female genital mutilation" and leave
the issue of the enormity of US and other Western aid funds in arms and
"population control" aside? What and whom are we forgetting then? At
the same time, we must ensure a greater willingness to listen to the stories
of the various struggles waged against "female genital mutilation" and to
situate them in the broader geo-political context.
For example, in Eritrea, the practice of "female genital mutilation" has
been dramatically decreased by the efforts of women and men of the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front who fought side by side for national
liberation and for a re-invented "culture". In a similar fashion, the
struggle in the Sudan has been waged by women, many of whom are
linked to the Sudanese Communist Party.
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The question now becomes one of interrogating and investigating the
links between metropolis and "Third World", between colonialism and
anti-colonialist struggles which resulted in the stunted nationalism which
thrives in the world of international capital circulation, and of the links
with the construction of identity in terms of nation and of gender.172 Then
we can begin to begin the deconstructive project of listening to the body
of the Other, not as absolute alterity nor as identity but as trace of the
global linkages and solidarities which at one and the same time limit and
impose possible interpretations and interventions but also make such
interventions our responsibility in order to establish and to transgress
boundaries, to remark the demarcation zones. For it is only when we
begin to recognize the political imperative aporetically inscribed in these
texts that politics and deconstruction, in other words, justice, present
themselves as the ever present possibility. Thus, in attempting to hear the
call of the Other's body inherent in the discursive matrix of practices of
"female genital mutilation", we hear not the authentic cry of the "Third
World" woman, the exotic Other in her authentic feminist reaction
against a universal patriarchy and its corollary of organized feminism, but
the cry of the aporetic repositioning of the woman Other in her re-
171. S. Hale, "Transforming Culture or Fostering Second-Hand Consciousness: Women's
Front Organizations and Revolutionary Parties-The Sudan Case" in Tucker, ibid.
172. See generally I. Grewal & C. Kaplan, eds., Scattered Hegemonies. Postmodernity and
Transnational Feminist Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); See
also Parker, supra note 61.
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interpretation of the reality in which she lives.'73 It is our responsibility
never to forget to hear the call of this Other which/who is written in the
materiality of her existence which we have created and which, therefore,
we are responsible.
Hearing the call tojustice, seeking to intervene in an act of interpretive
and political solidarity, then becomes the deferral of identity and perhaps
of justice itself. The union of self and Other, the deconstructive interro-
gation not just of the Other but more importantly of the forgetting of the
Other, brings us then to a stage of mourning the impossibility of the
impossible, of the constant circulation of the gift of justice, of its non-
iterability. This trace of alterity which circulates and contaminates the
debates on "female genital mutilation", the absent present written on the
body of the Other, calls us to a recognition of the two components of
justice, temporality and plurality. As Levinas urges:
Relationship with the future, the presence of the future in the present,
seems all the same accomplished in the face-to-face with the Other. The
situation of the face-to-face would be the very accomplishment of time; the
encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the subject
alone, but the intersubjective relationship. The condition of time lies in the
relationship between humans, in history. 1
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This union of self and other, of present and future, is constantly deferred,
replaced, displaced, interrogated. Time and alterity circulate and circum-
scribe as the declaration of the impossible, the possibility of the impos-
sibility, of the gift which is never given but which is offered in a displaced
relationship with the libidinal and the political economy written on the
body of the Other as "female genital mutilation". In Lacanian terms it is
objet a, in Derridean terms it is a circumcised justice, calling the memory
of a relationship beyond or before alterity with the female Other. It is that
which we have lost but which we seek to recover in this possibility of the
impossible. We must decide, yet, already,
Decision cannot appear to itself as "good" insofar as it will have truly
decided.... Every decision is made, by definition, in the undecidable....
I cannot decide without infinitely abandoning myself to the finitude of my
singularity and thus I cannot, in the strike and cut of my decision, renounce
appearing to myself as the "deciding" subject. This is also why my decision
173. See P. Cheah, "Master Text/NeoColonial Globe: Kant's Cosmopoliteia in Contempo-
rary Cultural Studies" in V. Kirby, ed., Shifting Ground: The Nature of Culture [unpublished].
174. E. Levinas, "Time and the Other" in The Levinas Reader (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.:
Blackwell, 1989) at 45. Den-ida's reading of the face-to-face with the Other further problematizes
the possibility of recognition i.e. ofjustice. See Bennington & Derrida, Jacques Derrida, supra
note 96 at 302. See also, R. Bernasconi, "Levinas and Derrida: The Question of the Closure of
Metaphysics" in Face To Face with Levinas, supra note 92 at 181; and L. Irigaray, "The
Fecundity of the Caress" in ibid. at 231.
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is identically, each time, a decision for relation and sharing-to the point
that the subject of my decision can appear to itself as not being simply "me"
(but also a "you" or an "us") without it being any less singularly my own,
if it is authentic. Yet it must be repeated that the decision does not appear
to itself: in this way it decides and is decided.'75
The responsibility which compels us to decide is a responsibility
which compels us equally to be responsible for the asymmetry, for the
aporia which accompanies every decision. Our obligation, like the gift
from which it flows, can never be extinguished. "This essential asymme-
try is the very basis of ethics; not only am I more responsible than the other
but I am even responsible for everyone else's responsibility!"' 76 This is
why we do not/cannot pay tribute to the women who struggle to end
"female genital mutilation". We cannot reduce the gift of justice, which
they inscribe in their demands, to the circulation of commodities in the
legal/libidinal economy. The circulation of the possible/impossible, the
just unjust, the unjust justice, the just rather occurs in another phase, in
another economy, the economy of the deterritorialized flow of the literal
body without organs, the rhizomatic disorganized organization'77 of a
life-giving cannibalism-the very cannibalism destroyed by "Western
civilization"-the most appropriate appropriation in the world economy
of "female genital mutilation"-where cannibalism becomes the only
possible route to the impossible. The double bind of the "Third World
Woman" consumes itself in the double invagination of justice. The body
of the Other consumes and is consumed by the body of the Law. Other
Law, the aporetic moment of the ultimate ethical face-to-face.
The question is no longer one of knowing if it is "good" to eat the other or
if the other is "good" to eat.... One eats him regardless and lets oneself
be eaten by him .... The moral question is thus not, nor can it ever be:
should one eat or not eat ... but since one must eat in any case and since
it is and tastes good to eat.., how for goodness sake should one eat well. I
The question of justice in neo/post-colonial Diaspora becomes one of
hospitality. 179 How should we treat our guests? How should our hosts treat
us? It is little wonder, then, that our relationship to/with/in diasporic
alterity and irreconcileability and then back to the legal bind of Lyotard's
differend can now be described by Baudrillard in terms of the cannibalism
175. J.L. Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, supra note 5 at 142.
176. E. Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas" in Face To Face with Levinas, supra
note 92 at 31.
177. See G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
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After The Subject? (New York: Routledge, 1991) at 114-15.
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The First Cut Is (Not) The Deepest
of the West in Diaspora. Food, starvation, consumption, death, anorexia
nervosa, "female genital mutilation", Somalia, Rwanda, Aboriginal/
black deaths in custody, justice.
Japanese culture is thus a cannibalistic form-assimilating, absorbing,
opening, devouring. Afro-Brazilian culture is also a rather good example
of cannibalism in this sense; it too devours white modem culture, and it too
is seductive in character. Cannibalism must indeed always be merely an
extreme form of the relationship to the other, and this includes cannibalism
in the relationship of love. Cannibalism is a radical form of hospitality.10
And it is this cannibalism, this devouring of the body of the Other, of
"female genital mutilation", that offers us the possibility of the impos-
sible, justice. For the cannibalized operates in a new way, as a gift, as it
inhabits the body, mind and spirit of the cannibal, the metropole. It is a
* .viral, spectral presence in the synapses of our brains, in the circuitry
of our rocketship, as 'Alien'; in the way in which the Whites have caught
the virus of origins, of Indianess, of Aboriginality, of Patagonicity."''11
The possibility of the impossible, of justice, inhabits us all because as
members of the cultural and political elite who produce and reproduce the
canons of imperialism and of the otherness of "female genital mutila-
tion", we have cannibalized the body of the Other. The Diaspora and the
colony are parts of our daily reality. But we must pause in our consump-
tion because of the disarray, of the cacophony around "female genital
mutilation", of the inscription of this body of the Other in the proscrip-
tions of the law, the differend, because people are now talking of justice
for "female genital mutilation", about reconciliation, we must be silent,
we must stop the production of texts and proceed to the production of
affect. We must Test, we must resist the artificial semiatic tlrry, the
sounds of legal discourse. We must let the Other come. As Avital Ronnell
puts it, and this is the beginning and the end of my text:
A true ethics of community, be it located in cyberspace or among lovers,
readers, artists, activists and so on, would have to locate a passivity beyond
passivity-a space of repose and reflection, a space that would let the other
come. Exposing oneself to the other, or to the other's death, has nothing to
do with action as such.
1 82
Let us pause before we take dessert. Let us pause before our deserts.
Let us just pause. Just us. Justice.
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